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Article 4

By Howard W. Brill*

Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 14
and Ancillary Jurisdiction
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have long struggled with the conflict between the limits of their constitutional and statutory jurisdiction
and their desire to provide complete relief to petitioning parties.
Because of problems associated with this tension, the federal
courts adopted the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction enables a court adjudicating a matter properly before it
to decide other related matters even though it would lack jurisdiction to decide the related matters if they were presented independently.
The doctrine was originally created to allow a federal court to
adjudicate all claims affecting a controversy properly brought
before it, but was soon expanded to permit the hearing of compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims as well. With the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 19381 ancillary jurisdiction
was further expanded into third-party practice. Much of this
growth was without the direct approval of the Supreme Court.
While the Court set forth new tests for pendent jurisdiction, it refused to clarify differences between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction or to indicate the scope of ancillary jurisdiction under the
Federal Rules. The Court has now acted, however, by apparently
calling a halt to any further expansion of ancillary jurisdiction with
the 1978 decision of Owen Equipment & Erection Company v. Kroger.2
This article will first examine the development of ancillary jurisdiction in the federal courts. Second, the impact of Kroger, the
first Supreme Court decision in more than fifty years to analyze
ancillary jurisdiction, on the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in
third-party practice will be discussed. Finally, the article will ex* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. 302 U.S. 783 (1937) (Order by Supreme Court). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS 291-92 (3d ed. 1976).
2. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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amine several instances in which the probable implications of Kroger should, and perhaps can, be avoided.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Doctrine's Traditional Uses

Ancillary jurisdiction was first invoked in cases involving a
court's exercise of jurisdiction over property interests. In the leading case of Freemanv. Howe, 3 a United States marshall acting pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by a federal court seized some
railroad cars. Subsequently, several mortgagees of the cars, who
were not parties to the federal suit, brought a replevin action in a
state court to recover the cars.4 The Court held that where a federal court had control over property, it had the power to decide5
every question arising in the action with respect to that property.
The mortgagees argued that if they could not bring the replevin
action in state court, the lack of diversity between themselves and
the marshall would bar the replevin action in federal court. The
Court, however, rejected that argument and stated that a replevin
action could have been heard as a part of the original federal action. "The principle is that a bill .... is not an original suit, but
ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original
suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 6
The use of ancillary jurisdiction over matters related to property within the control of a court was soon adopted by other federal courts and today continues to apply in numerous situations.
For example, when receivers appointed to preserve the assets of
an insolvent savings association sought to have a federal court impose a constructive trust on several tracts of real estate, the court
regarded the new claim as ancillary. 7 Since the new matter was
related to the property under the8 court's control, no independent
jurisdictional basis was required.
A second category of ancillary jurisdiction allows a federal
court to hear matters that are subordinate or related to the principal claim and enhance the court's existing jurisdiction. For in3. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). See generally Note, The Ancillary Concept and
the FederalRules, 64 HARv. L. REV. 968 (1951); Note, Ancillary Jurisdictionof
the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REV. 383 (1963).
4. 65 U.S. at 453.
5. Id. at 456.
6. Id. at 460.
7. Tcherepnin v. Franz, 485 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1973).
8. Within its considerable discretion as to the form of proceeding, the trial court
could allow a separate suit, compel the parties to join under Rule 13(g) or
consolidate the actions under Rule 42. Id. at 1256 n.8.
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stance, the court may bar a state court from relitigating issues
already decided in a federal court, or it may issue a writ to ensure
the efficacy of its judgment.9 Under this second approach the federal courts have protected their jurisdiction by granting writs of
mandamus and prohibition, temporary injunctions, and writs of ne
exeat.'0
A third type of ancillary jurisdiction, also unsupported by statutes or rules, developed in the federal system to enhance a court's
ability to independently ajudicate the case before it. For example,
before a federal trial court in a civil action seeking a refund of corporate income taxes, a plaintiff and his attorney became dissatisfied with each other. Although the attorney withdrew from the
case, he refused to relinquish his files, claiming a retaining lien for
unpaid fees. Accepting a broad definition of ancillary jurisdiction,
the court concluded that it had ancillary jurisdiction to interpret
the fee arrangement between the New Jersey corporation and the
New Jersey attorney even though it would not have been able to
independently adjudicate the dispute." Thus, the court exercised
its ancillary jurisdiction to determine the controversy before it,
completely and fairly.' 2
B. The Doctrine's Expansion
If the three categories described were the extent of ancillary
jurisdiction, the doctrine would be of limited use. The Supreme
Court, however, vastly expanded the doctrine in 1926 when it
decided Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.13 In that case Western Union agreed to distribute price quotations to firms and individuals which had been approved by the Cotton Exchange. The
Cotton Exchange refused to allow the quotations to be telegraphed
to the plaintiff because of his prior illegal practice. Alleging that
trade was being restrained in violation of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff sought a decree barring Western Union and the Cotton
Exchange from refusing to install the ticker which furnished the
9. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 22. See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l
Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 89-90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
10. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION § 3523, at 61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].

11. Jersey Land &Dev. Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.J. 1972).
12. A case reaching the same conclusion as to the existence of ancillary jurisdiction is Andrews v. Central Sur. Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1223 (D.S.C. 1969). But
see Warren G. Kleban Eng'r Co. v. Caldwell, 490 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1974) (no
ancillary jurisdiction to hear dispute involving construction contracts merely
because they related to schools under a federal court desegregation order);
Gounougias v. Peters, 369 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1966) (tort action terminated
before fee dispute arose).
13. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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continuous cotton quotations.' 4 The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff was improperly receiving price
quotations from other sources, thereby impairing the value of the
defendants' property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but
5
issued an injunction for the defendants on their counterclaim.
Since the plaintiff and defendants were both citizens of New
York and the dispute no longer involved a federal question,' 6 the
plaintiff argued, inter alia, that there was no jurisdiction supporting the counterclaim. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and upheld the ruling of the district court. Equity Rule 30 allowed
a counterclaim if it was one "arising out of the transaction which is
the subject matter of the suit.' 7 The Court concluded that the
counterclaim fell within the scope of this procedural rule and emphasized that "'[t] ransaction' is a word of flexible meaning, which
may take in a series of occurrences which depend upon their logical relationship rather than upon the immediateness of their connection."' 8 While the essential facts of the two claims were not
identical, the Court found that enough similarity existed to conclude that they did arise out of the same transaction. 9 Although
the Court did not speak of ancillary jurisdiction, its broad interpretation of "transaction" in Equity Rule 30 provided the basis for the
compulsory counterclaim rule in the Federal Rules and for the
modern expansion of federal ancillary jurisdiction.
Although the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are
technically distinct,20 the tests used to analyze the employment of
14. Id. at 602.
15. Id. at 603.
16. The Court emphasized that the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint
was not because there was an absence of jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
Instead the facts alleged were simply insufficient to establish a case under
the Sherman Act. Since there was initial jurisdiction over the complaint, the
counterclaim could not be dismissed on the preliminary basis. Id. at 608.
17. Id. at 609.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 610.
20. The usual distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction has been
based on the following elements: 1) pendent jurisdiction requires that the
original action be based upon a federal claim, while ancillary jurisdiction
need not be; 2) pendent jurisdiction requires that the additional claim be asserted by the plaintiff while any party may assert a claim under ancillary jurisdiction; 3) pendent jurisdiction involves the addition of a new claim, while
ancillary jurisdiction may involve the addition of both claims and parties; 4)
pendent jurisdiction has a clear discretionary aspect, while in ancillary jurisdiction and discretionary function is less distinct; 5) pendent jurisdiction
rests upon the interpretation of article EIl, while the operation of ancillary
jurisdiction is authorized by the Federal Rules; 6) pendent jurisdiction permits the issue of discretion to remain open throughout the pleading stage and
perhaps to the time of trial, while the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is usu-
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the respective doctrines are similar, if not the same. 21 Indeed, the
Court has commented that "there is little profit in attempting to
decide... whether there are any principled differences between
ancillary and pendent jurisdictions." 22 Thus, the cases involving
the expansion of pendent jurisdiction may be applicable to ancillary jurisdiction and should be examined together with the cases
that have expanded ancillary jurisdiction.
The leading case in the area of pendent jurisdiction is UMW v.
Gibbs.2 3 A coal company hired Gibbs to open a new mine using
members of the Southern Labor Union and gave Gibbs a contract
to haul the mine's coal. Members of the United Mine Workers forcibly prevented Gibbs from opening the mine.24 Claiming that
these efforts were the results of a concerted union plan, Gibbs
sought recovery under the Taft-Hartley Act. He also alleged a
state law claim that there had been an unlawful boycott and conspiracy to interfere with his contract of employment. 25 The jury
awarded Gibbs $74,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in
punitive damages on both the federal and state laws claims. After
the verdict, the trial court concluded that union pressure to discharge Gibbs was not cognizable under the federal
act, but did af26
firm a reduced award on the state law claim.
The Supreme Court recognized the threshold question as
whether the trial court had properly entertained jurisdiction of the
state claim. The Court had previously followed the rule that if two
distinct grounds in support of "a single cause of action" were alleged, the non-federal claim could be heard along with the federal
claim.27 Because the phrase "cause of action" was discarded with
the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 it was necessary for the
Court to redefine the earlier test. The Court could have redefined
the test without expanding it, but decided that the earlier cases

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ally decided when it is raised; and 7) pendent jurisdiction is a federal doctrine, while ancillary jurisdiction exists also under state procedural rules.
See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines,22 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1263 (1975).
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976). The confusion over the relationship
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction is illustrated by two cases that
interpret the the Court's decision in Kroger differently. CompareFord Motor
Co. v. Wallenius Lines, Etc., 476 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 n.5 (E.D. Vir. 1979) ("the
Court ... did not permit diversity jurisdiction to be a basis for pendent party
jurisdiction.") with Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams, 83 F.R.D. 398, 401 n.6 (D.
Mass. 1979) ('Thus ancillary rather than pendent jurisdiction was involved
[in Kroger]").
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Id. at 718.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720-21.
See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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had adopted a "limited approach [that] is unnecessarily grudging." 28 The Court noted that the correct test is much broader:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there
is a claim "arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States
and treaties" . . . and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the
entire action before the court com29
prises but one constitutional case.

Justice Brennan outlined the scope of pendent jurisdiction: (1)
The federal claim must have sufficient substance to support subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the state and federal claims must arise
from "a common nucleus of operative facts;"' 30 (3) the claim must
be such that the plaintiff would ordinarily try them in one judicial
proceeding; (4) as a matter for a court's discretion, pendent jurisdiction should only be exercised after consideration of judicial
economy and convenience, and fairness to litigants; (5) federal
courts should avoid unnecessary decisions of state law, both as a
matter of comity and to promote justice by permitting a state court
to interpret state law; 31 and (6) if the federal issues are not substantial, or if the state issues predominate in terms of proof or
comprehensiveness of remedy, a state claim should be dismissed
without prejudice and left to state tribunals.3 2 Justice Brennan
concluded that the district court had not exceeded its discretion in
upholding the judgment on the state claim after it dismissed the
federal labor law claim. The federal issues were not so remote or
minor in significance as to conclude that in effect only the state
33
claim had been tried.
28. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Goldberg, The Influence of
ProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction,28 STA. L. REv. 395, 418 (1976):
Thus Gibbs suggests that ancillary and pendent jurisdiction did not
exist fully developed and waiting to be "discovered" prior to promulagation of the Federal Rules in 1938. Rather, the tests for such jurisdiction were changed in response to procedural modifications, which
had created the need for more expansive jurisdiction to match the
greater reach of new joinder provisions.
29. 383 U.S. at 725.
30. Id.
31. Justice Brennan suggested that this may be the primary argument against
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 726.
32. Id. at 726-27.
33. Id. at 728-29. On the merits, the verdict was reversed because the trial court
record persuasively indicated that the union had done all that it could to prevent or curtail the violence. Id. at 739. A five part approach to the analysis of
the discretionary factors of Gibbs is suggested by Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams, 83 F.R.D. 398 (D. Mass. 1979): (1) "Can the court exercise pendent jurisdiction effectively and fairly without also exercising jurisdiction over a
pendent party?" Id. at 403. (2) "Would separate federal and state trials be
substantially likely to produce outcomes that are in conflict?" Id. at 404. (3)
"Would consolidation of the primary and pendent claims be likely to reduce
substantially the committment of judicial and private resources to dispute
resolution?" Id. at 404. (4) "Is the federal forum the only forum where the
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The next important case in the expanding development of jurisdiction was Moor v. County of Alameda.34 Plaintiffs filed actions in
federal court under the Civil Rights Act 35 to recover damages for
injuries suffered when a deputy sheriff discharged a shotgun in an
attempt to quell a civil disturbance. In addition plaintiffs brought
state claims against Alameda County under a California statute
making the county vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its
deputies. Plaintiffs argued that the federal court had authority to
hear their state law claims against the county under the doctrine of
36
pendent jurisdiction.
The trial court refused to entertain the state law claim and entered a final judgment with respect to the county.3 7 The Supreme
Court agreed that the trial court had properly refused to exercise
pendent jurisdiction. 38 Although the federal and state causes of
action did involve a common nucleus of operative fact, the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction would have required the court to bring a
new defendant into the litigation. Gibbs had not involved such a
"pendent party." As to the county, there was no federal claim, and
for there was
therefore there could be no pendent state claim,
39
nothing to which the state claim could attach.
The Court recognized that exercising federal jurisdiction over
parties as to whom there is no independent basis of jurisdiction is
analagous to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, but refused to
answer the basic question of "[w]hether there existed judicial
power to hear the state law claims. '40 The Court reasoned that

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

primary and pendent claims can be consolidated for trial? If not, is the practical importance to the parties of the primary claim at least as great as that of
the pendent claim?" Id. at 405. (5) "Is it unlikely that in deciding the pendent claim the federal court will itself be required to answer unsettled question of state law?" Id. at 405.
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1976). See Note, Section 1988: An Alternative to Vicariously Liability Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1156 (1979).
411 U.S. at 696.
Id. at 697.
The Court agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a cause of action
against the county under the federal Civil Rights statutes. However, the
Court reversed the lower courts in concluding that the county was a citizen of
California for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. Therefore the plaintiff Moor, a citizen of Illinois, would be able to proceed with his action against
the county, basing jurisdiction on the diversity provisions. However it would
be an abuse of discretion to tie the claim of the California plaintiff to the
claim of the Illinois plaintiff. The actions had been brought separately, involved different injuries, and had been consolidated only for the purposes of
appeal. Id. at 716 n.36.
Id. at 712-13. Justice Marshall did note the tendency of the lower federal
courts to allow pendent claims and pendent parties where the entire action
comprised only "one constitutional 'case.'" Id. at 713 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
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even if the trial court had the power to hear the pendent party
claim, it had properly exercised its discretion in declining to join
the state claims with the federal claims. The federal court would
have had to resolve difficult questions of state law, and the special
defenses available to the county under the California Tort Claim
Act 4 ' might have unduly complicated the case if tried before a
jury.42 These two factors enabled the trial 4court
to exercise its dis3
cretion in refusing to join the state claim.
Aldinger v. Howard44 involved the question not answered in
Moor: whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction extends to parties to whom there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction.
Aldinger was hired as a clerk by the Spokane County Treasurer.
Two months later the treasurer informed her that she would be
dismissed because she was living with her boyfriend. Aldinger
brought an action in federal court against the treasurer, alleging a
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 45 A state statute waived
sovereign immunity and provided for vicarious liability against the
state for the tortious conduct of its officials. Although there was no
basis for diversity jurisdiction over a claim against the county
since both she and the county were citizens of Washington, Aldinger argued
that there was pendent jurisdiction over such a state
46
law claim.
The Supreme Court reviewed other cases involving expansion
of federal jurisdiction. 47 The first line of cases involve pendent jurisdiction, which build on Gibbs and concern the addition of claims
over which there is no independent federal power. The Court
noted, however, that none of these cases involved the question of
whether a non-federal claim could be the basis for joining a party
over whom no independent federal jurisdiction existed. The parallel line of cases involves ancillary jurisdiction, stretching from
Freeman to Moore. In these cases the Court "identified certain
considerations which justified the joining of parties with respect to
'48
whom there was no independent basis of federal jurisdiction.
The plaintiff built her case for federal jurisdiction on the merger
of the two doctrines. She alleged a federal question claim against
49
one defendant and a factually related state claim against another.
41. CAL.GoVr. CODE § 815.2 (West 1974).
42. The Court did not mention that under the federal rules the district court
could avoid undue jury confusion by ordering separate trials.
43. 411 U.S. at 716-7.
44. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
45. Id. at 3-4.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 6-16.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 3-5.
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Moore, although traditionally treated as an ancillary jurisdiction
case, did not use the term "ancillary." It adopted a transactional
test similar to that subsequently set out in Gibbs.5 0 Therefore,
Aldinger argued, there is no significant difference between the doctrines of ancillary jurisdiction, which had traditionally been used
to bring in new parties, and pendent jurisdiction, which had traditionally been used to bring in new claims. Since the Federal Rules
encourage joinder of claims and parties, Aldinger argued that she
should be able to assert her nonfederal claim against the county
because it shared acommon nucleus of operative
fact with her fed5
eral claim against the individual defendant. '
The Supreme Court again hedged on the basic question:
[W] e think it quite unnecessary to formulate any general, all-emcompassing jurisdictional rule. Given the complexities of the many manifestations of federal jurisdiction, together with the countless factual
permutations possible under the Federal Rules, there is little profit in attempting to decide, for example, whether there are any "principled" differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what
effect Gibbs had on such differences. . . . We think the better approach
is to determine what Gibbs did and did not decide and to identify what we
deem are important differences
5 2 between the jurisdiction sustained in
Gibbs and that asserted here

Gibbs authorized a state law claim against a party already in
federal court.5 3 While recognizing the limits of federal jurisdiction
and refusing to allow the claim against the county to be heard, the
Court emphasized that it was deciding only the issue of pendent
party jurisdiction involving a claim brought under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 4 The Court refused to develop a broad theory of jurisdiction but did say that "if the new party sought to be
joined is not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction, there is a
more serious obstacle to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction than
if parties already before the court are required to litigate a state56
law claim."5 5 Federal jurisdiction was left in an unsettled state.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
The three dissenters argued that the principles of Gibbs should apply to pendent state law claims, regardless of whether the defendant was already in
federal court. Such a result prevents forum shopping and multiple actions,
saves time, and reduces the cost of litigants. Now a plaintiff must seek redress in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and redress for the same
wrongs under state law in the state court. This splitting is required "regardless of the balance of the discretionary factors enunciated in Gibbs, the clarity of state law,,... the absolute identity of factual issues between the two
claims ... the monetary expense and other disadvantages of duplicate litiga-
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III. OWEN EQUIPMENT & ERECTION CO. v. KROGER
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger5 7 will dominate the
area of ancillary jurisdiction for some time. In January 1972, James
D. Kroger was helping to move a large steel tank at an Iowa construction site. He was walking alongside the tank to steady it as it
was being transported by a large crane. When the boom on the
crane came in contact with high-tension lines, Kroger was electrocuted.5 8 His widow, as administratrix of his estate, filed a wrongful
death action in November 1973 in Nebraska Federal District Court.
She was an Iowa citizen at the commencement of the lawsuit. The
defendants were the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), a Nebraska corporation, which allegedly owned the power lines, and
the Paxton & Vierling Steel Company, a Nebraska corporation that
had leased the crane for the construction project.5 9 The Power
District had sold the lines and equipment to Paxton in the early
1960's. Thereafter OPPD sold electricity to Paxton and made necessary repairs upon the lines and equipment.
During the pretrial stage, the defendant Omaha Public Power
District impleaded as a third-party defendant Owen Equipment &
Erection Co., a Nebraska corporation that owned the crane. Under
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, the Nebraska defendant was
deentitled to seek indemnification from the Nebraska third-party
60
fendant without establishing a federal jurisdictional basis.
Omaha Public Power District moved for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted, and which the Eighth Circuit af-

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 35-36 (Brennan, Marshall,
tion. . . the waste of judicial time .
Blackmun J.J., dissenting).
437 U.S. 365 (1978).
Id. at 367.
Kroger v. Owen Equip. &Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 429 (8th Cir. 1977). Paxton had been made a party for the sole purpose of determining any rights
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The third-party complaint may have been defective. Since 1946, Rule 14(a)
has required that the third-party defendant be arguably liable to the defendant, not merely liable to the plaintiff. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 1441, at 200-01
(1971). In this instance the third-party complaint had alleged merely that
Owen's negligence caused Kroger's death. The basis of Owen's liability to
Omaha was nowhere spelled out, but Omaha may have been relying upon the
state common law right of contribution. Owen never challenged this possible
defect, and therefore the third-party complaint and the ancillary jurisdictional basis for it remained unquestioned. 437 U.S. 365, 378 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
Defendant Paxton and third party Owen Equipment were connected in
that Paxton owned all the stock of Owen and both corporations had the same
headquarters and the same officers. Paxton had formed Owen Equipment to
avoid possible labor disputes. Owen Equipment leased the cranes to Paxton,
and the crane operators were included in the leasing arrangements.
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firmed.6 1 Summary judgment was granted because Paxton owned
the transmission lines, and OPPD had no duty to maintain the
lines under the applicable Iowa law. Furthermore, OPPD had not
been asked to disconnect electricity on the accident date, and had
no notice that a crane was being operated in the vicinity of the
from the lawsuit belines. Defendant Paxton was later dismissed 62
cause of an unidentified jurisdictional defect.
By the time of trial the parties had been reduced to two: the
plaintiff Kroger and the third-party defendant Owen Equipment.
Kroger had been permitted to assert a direct claim against Owen
Equipment as a party defendant after it had been added as a thirdparty defendant. 63 During the third day of trial the corporate secretary of Owen Equipment surprised Kroger and the court by testifying that Owen Equipment's principal place of business was in
Carter Lake, Iowa. Owen Equipment immediately challenged the
jurisdiction of the court, claiming lack of diversity. 64 Since section
1332(c) of the Judicial Code65 provides that a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and of the state where it
has its principal place of business, Owen Equipment was a citizen
of both Nebraska and Iowa for purposes of federal jurisdiction.
Since Federal Rule 12(h) (3) requires the court to dismiss an action
when it lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter whenever that defect is made apparent, 66 Owen Equipment properly moved to dismiss the action. The trial judge, however, refused to grant the
motion.
The trial judge relied on several factors in ruling that the case
should be heard. First, the complaint had alleged that Owen
Equipment was "'a Nebraska corporation with its principal place
of business in Nebraska.' "67 Rather than denying this allegation,
Owen Equipment had used a qualified general denial. It had admitted that it was "'a corporation organized and existing under the
Laws of the State of Nebraska"' and denied every other allegation
in the complaint.68 The court found that by using such an evasive
denial, Owen Equipment had violated Federal Rule 8(b) by failing
to admit as much of the allegation as was true. Second, Owen
61. Kroger v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 523 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
62. The nature of the dismissal does not appear in the order of the trial court.
Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 429 (8th Cir. 1977).
63. 437 U.S. at 368.
64. Id. at 369.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
66. In its critical questioning, the circuit court characterized the rule requiring
dismissal when even a defect in subject matter jurisdiction is discovered as
an American judicial "fetish." 558 F.2d at 427 n.37.
67. Id. at 419 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
68. Id. (quoting defendant's answer).
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Equipment failed at any time during the two years prior to trial to
specifically challenge the jurisdiction of the court.6 9 The Court
reasoned that failure to challenge until trial amounted to an admission of the allegation of Owen Equipment's citizenship.
Third, by filing no challenge, Owen Equipment had lulled the
plaintiff into believing that its principal place of business was in
Nebraska. If the trial court had granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff would have been left without a cause of action
70
in state court because the Iowa statute of limitations had run.
Fourth, the trial court relied upon the minority view that no independent basis for jurisdiction is necessary for the plaintiff to assert a claim against a third-party defendant. The court found
support in Gibbs for its conclusion that a federal court has the jurisdictional power to adjudicate the entire case before it, including
claims that derive from a common nucleus
both federal and state
71
of operative facts.
Since the court held that it had the power to hear the entire
case, the only question that remained was whether it would exercise its power after consideration of all the relevent factors. The
and after a jury trial72 Kroger recourt decided to allow the case,
73
ceived a verdict of $234,756.
Owen Equipment appealed the trial court's decision concerning
its ancillary jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.74 To the court of appeals, defendant OPPD's original im69. Id. at 419. The trial court relied on Biggs v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transf.,
280 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1960). The Supreme Court suggested that the sudden
revelation may have been a problem of geography. Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 369 n.5 (1978). In general the Missouri River marks
the boundary between Iowa and Nebraska. However, Carter Lake, Iowa,
where the accident occurred and where Owen Equipment had its main office,
lies west of the river. The town is within ten miles of the Omaha metropolitan area. Previously the river had shifted course, cutting the town of Carter
Lake, Iowa off from the rest of Iowa. The opinions do not clarify whether the
Owen officials and attorneys had been confused for two years as to whether
the corporation was located in Iowa or Nebraska.
70. For an example of an instance in which the defendant successfully and permissibly delayed raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction until the statute of limitations had run, see Knee v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. 293
F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
71. 558 F.2d at 419.
72. The substantive theory upon which the case went to the jury was that either
the crane supplied by the third party defendant Owen Equipment was unsafe
for the purpose for which it was intended, or that the Owen Equipment employed the crane operator and was therefore liable for his negligent acts.
73. Id. at 418.
74. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977). The position that the Eighth Circuit adopted was the position that had been increasingly argued by the commentators. See 3 W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 14.27 [1], at 14-565 to 14-574 [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S]. (2d
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pleader of Owen Equipment was a classic example of ancillary
jurisdiction not requiring an independent jurisdictional basis. Yet
the dispute was not the defendant's addition of a third party; it was
the plaintiff's assertion of a claim against the third party. While
Federal Rule 14(a) allows a plaintiff to assert a claim against a
third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurence
that is the subject matter of the original claim, it does not clarify
whether an independent basis of jurisdiction is required when the
plaintiff proceeds against the impleaded third party. Nor should
the rule answer that question. In view of the mandate of Rule 7825
that the Federal Rules should not extend or restrict jurisdiction,
the question of jurisdictional limitations is not to be answered by
the Rules but is to be answered by the Constitution, by legislative
mandate, and by judicial interpretation.
The court of appeals noted that the vast majority of cases have
held that if the plaintiff brings a claim against a third-party defendant, there must be an independent ground of jurisdiction.7 6 Yet
the underlying reasons for the restrictive rule 77 requiring an independent basis for jurisdiction disappeared with the Court's decision in Gibbs. The Gibbs Court emphasized that the federal court
has jurisdictional power to adjudicate all of the facts before it if the
additional claim arises out of the core of operative facts that gave
rise to the primary claim.7 8 The critical question is whether the
court should exercise that power. The court of appeals noted that
to allow an Iowa third-party defendant to sue an Iowa plaintiff but
not to allow an Iowa plaintiff to sue an Iowa third-party defendant

75.
76.
77.

78.

ed. 1978); WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 1444, at 234-38, § 1459, at 311-14 (1971); Fraser, Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts of Actions Involving Multiple Claims,
76 F.R.D. 525, 538-543 (1978).
For analysis of the decision of the Eighth Circuit, see 11 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 631 (1977); 8 CUMB. L. REV. 965 (1978); 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 416 (1978);
26 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1978); 62 MiNN. L. REv. 251 (1978); 43 Mo. L. REV. 310
(1978); 54 N.D. L. REV. 314 (1977); 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 939 (1977); 9 ST. MARY'S L.J.
599 (1978); 23 S.D. L. REv. 499 (1978). Reaching the same conclusion as the
Eighth Circuit was Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan.
1975), noted in 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 164 (1976).
"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein ... " FED. R.
Crv. P. 82.
558 F.2d at 422.
The rule prevents a plaintiff from suing a citizen of the same state, eliminates
possible collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant to obtain federal
jurisdiction over a third party, and protects the federal courts from being
overcrowded with state claims. 558 F.2d at 423, n. 25, (relying on Kenrose Mfg.
Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1975).
558 F.2d at 423.
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would be reverting to a discarded system of procedure. 79 In contrast with Aldinger, the plaintiff was not attempting to add a new
party; Owen Equipment was already before the court on the thirdparty claim for indemnity.
The court of appeals reasoned that judicial economy and convenience would be served by having this case heard in federal
court after the completion of pre-trial pleading and discovery. To
dismiss the case after the statute of limitations had expired would
be unfair to the plaintiff, who relied upon the evasive answer of the
third-party defendant.8 0 This deceit may have justified the court's
retention of jurisdiction. In addition, once jurisdiction was determined at the commencement of the action, the court's resources
were committed to the claim. Thus, the court concluded that the
trial court had correctly entertained Kroger's claim against Owen
Equipment. 81
Owen Equipment sought and obtained a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.82 The Court took the position that Gibbs and Kroger were two examples of the same generic problem: when may a
federal court hear a state claim arising between citizens of the
same state? The Court stated that the Eighth Circuit had failed to
understand the scope of Gibbs:
The Gibbs case differed from this one in that it involved pendent jurisdiction, which concerns the resolution of a plaintiff's federal and state law
79. Id. at 423-24 (relying on 3 MOORE'S, supra note 74, $ 14.27 [1], at 14-570 to -572,
which is a reversal of the opinion held in an earlier edition).
80. Id. at 427.
81. The dissenting judge first concluded that Gibbs did not apply because in that
case there had clearly been jurisdiction over a federal claim and therefore a
state claim could be added. But in Krogerthe question was whether the only
remaining claim, which was a state claim, could be heard under ancillary jurisdiction. Second, the Supreme Court decision in Aldinger required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, even though the same facts might be involved in all
three claims. Id. at 430 (Bright, J., dissenting). If Kroger had wished to sue
all the parties together, she could have done so in a state court. Third, Gibbs
interpreted article I of the Constitution because Congress had not spoken.
Here Congress had defined diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
Fourth, the majority rule is that an independent basis of jurisdiction is required. Fifth, while Owens was certainly acting improperly in concealing this
defense until the trial, a party cannot by his conduct be barred under a doctrine of estoppel from raising the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 431-32 (Bright, J., dissenting). The court should take appropriate
steps to sanction the attorneys but should not expand federal jurisdiction.
Sanctions against the attorney might include costs, expenses and a reasonable sum for opposing attorneys' fees. This drastic remedy would deter other
litigants from concealing or failing to present known jurisdictional facts to
the court. Finally, a saving provision in the Iowa statute of limitations might
still allow the plaintiff to bring an action against Owen Equipment in Iowa
state court. Id. at 432 (Bright, J., dissenting).
82. 437 U.S. 367.
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claims against a single defendant in one action. By contrast, in this case
there was no claim based upon federal
8 3 law, but rather state-law tort
claims against two different defendants.

While Gibbs establishes the outer limits of federal judicial
power under Article m of the Constitution, the Court must also
look to the acts of Congress for guidance. The Court stated that
section 1332 and "its predecessors have consistently ...
require[d] complete diversity of citizenship,8 4 and mentioned its
previous holding that each member in the class must satisfy the
statutory jurisdictional amount of $10,000, rejecting the view that
the smaller claims were ancillary.8 5 If a conflict exists between the
policies of complete diversity and a single resolution of an entire
case arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts, the Court
reasoned that the former must govern because that policy of limitation, within the outer limits of constitutional authorization, is
congressionally mandated.8 6 Hence, the Court held that plaintiff
could not sue Owen Equipment directly because citizens of Iowa
87
would have been on both sides of the lawsuit.
The Court concluded that if ancillary judisdiction were allowed
in such cases, a plaintiff could avoid the requirement of complete
diversity simply by suing only diverse defendants and then waiting for them to file third-party actions against non-diverse defendants.8 8 Even though the plaintiff might find it more advantageous
to sue all of the defendants at once, he could conclude that it would
be preferable to sue only selected defendants and thus assure himself access to the federal system. If the only requirement for ancillary jurisdiction were the constitutional requirement of a common
nucleus of operative fact, it follows that the plaintiff could have
sued Owen Equipment directly without waiting for the institution
of the third-party claim. Such a result would clearly have evaded
the statutory requirement of complete diversity.
The Court recognized that "ancillary jurisdiction over non-federal claims has often been upheld in cases involving impleader,
cross-claims, or counterclaims."8 9 A claim by a plaintiff against a
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978).
437 U.S. at 373 (footnote omitted).
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1970).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 374. Although this might be viewed as a possible abuse of the thirdparty action, there is nothing necessarily fraudulent or collusive about a
plaintiff selectively suing only tortfeasors of diverse citizenship in federal
court. Section 1359 of the Judicial Code, barring collusive attempts to create
federal jurisdiction, would not cover such a selection of defendants. Id. at 374
n.17. See also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969); 3A
MOORE'S, supra note 14, 17.05, at 17-39 to -57.
89. 437 U.S. at 375.
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third-party defendant presents quite a different situation. First,
the Court stated that when a defendant impleads a third-party defendant, the resolution of that claim is usually contingent to some
degree on the resolution of the main claim. 90 The relation of the
impleader to the primary claim is not "mere factual similarity but
logical dependence." 9 1 Kroger's claim against Owen Equipment,
however, was altogether separate from the primary claim against
the defendant OPPD because Owen Equipment's liability to Kroger was not contingent on OPPD's liability to Kroger. The separateness of her claim was particularly apparent because the
defendant OPPD had already been dismissed from the action.
"Far from being an ancillary
and dependent claim, it was a new
'92
and independent claim.
Second, the Court noted that when Kroger elected to bring her
state-law claim in federal court rather than state court, she voluntarily accepted the limitations of federal jurisdiction, and was estopped from later complaining that jurisdiction was not broad
enough to encompass the additional claim against Owen. 93 Kroger's attempt to sue Owen directly is in stark contrast to the normal use of ancillary jurisdiction which "typically involves claims
by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another
person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in federal court."94 Mere considerations of convenience or judicial economy cannot justify nondiverse
parties in direct trangression of the mandate of federal statutory
law.
Justices White and Brennan dissented. Justice White found no
support for the majority's holding in either article III or in statutory law.95 He argued that since the claim by Kroger against Owen
Equipment arose out of the same transaction and from a common
nucleus of operative fact, the claim satisfied both Rule 14(a) and
article III as interpreted in Gibbs. Justice White stated that the
Court's holding that the trial court lacked ancillary jurisdiction
would expand the scope of complete diversity and limit the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 96
The majority recognized that exceptions to the complete diversity requirement existed for cross-claims, counterclaims, and impleader. Since the Court approved ancillary jurisdiction in those
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 376.
(citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)).
at 376.
at 378 (White, J. dissenting).
at 380.
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cases despite the doctrine of complete diversity, Justice White saw
no reason why it should not allow ancillary jurisdiction
when a
97
plaintiff proceeds against a third-party defendant.
Justice White acknowledged that generally pre-trial dismissal
of a federal claim as occurred in Kroger would require dismissing
the non-federal claim. But in light of the unusual facts of the case,
especially the timing of the revelation of Owen Equipment's citizenship, Justice White concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to dismiss Kroger's claim against Owen
Equipment. 98 The plaintiff did not bring the third-party defendant
into the lawsuit. Indeed, at the time of trial Kroger believed that
Owen Equipment was a Nebraska citizen. If she had wished to sue
Owen Equipment, Kroger would have done so directly under this
mistaken factual assumption. It was only subsequently that the
Iowa citizenship of Owen Equipment was revealed. Clearly there
was no collusion or fraud on the part of the plaintiff in originally
failing to bring an action against Owen Equipment. In the ordinary
situation a plaintiff has no assurance that a defendant will attempt
or be able to implead any particular third-party defendant. Thus,
Justice White argued that since the plaintiff has no control over
whether the defendant will implead another party, the fact that
plaintiff could not have brought an original action against the
third-party defendant in federal court should be irrelevant to the
determination of whether ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party defendant exists.9 9
Justice White did not understand his position to mean that a
federal court would be compelled to hear a non-federal claim form
a plaintiff against a third-party defendant. The court should still
examine each situation on a case-by-case basis in light of the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness as it did in
Gibbs.100
III. DEFENDANT v. THIRD PARTY
The classic third-party claim arises where a plaintiff sues a defendant and the defendant seeks indemnification from a thirdparty defendant. Ancillary jurisdiction reaches this situation and
an independent basis of jurisdiction is not required. 01' Ancillary
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 382 nA.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 383 n.7.
See WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 1444, at 217-19. For a comprehensive summary
of the jurisdictional rules regarding third parties before the upheaval of the
past decade and a half, see Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinderof
Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 38-43 (1964). For the updated anal-
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jurisdiction exists not because of Rule 14,102 but because of the
traditional desire of
courts to dispose of all the related parts of a
103
case in one action.
If the primary claim is based on diversity, ancillary jurisdiction
supports the impleader regardless of whether the defendant and
third-party defendant are from the same state, 10 4 whether the
plaintiff and the third-party defendant are from the same state, 05
or whether the claim between the defendant and the third-party
defendant is less than the jurisdictional amount. 0 6 There is ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party claims irrespective of whether
the primary claim that gives the court jurisdiction is based upon an
exclusive grant of jurisdiction under a federal statute 10 7 or
whether it is based upon a concurrent grant of jurisdiction. 108 Ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party claim continues even
though the primary claim is settled' 09 or dismissed." 0 Kroger does
not affect this type of ancillary jurisdiction-the majority specifi-

102.

103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

ysis, see Fraser, Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts ofActions Involving Multiple Claims, 76 F.R.D. 525, 535-45 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction covers subject
matter jurisdiction, but not personal jurisdiction. The third party plaintiff
must still acquire personal jurisdiction over the third party defendant pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule 4 and the due process requirements of
International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See, e.g., Sunn
Classic Pictures, Inc. v. Budco, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
See FED. R. Cirv. P. 82. For an examination of the effect of Rule 82 on jurisdiction, see Goldberg, supra note 28, at 443. The author argues that Federal Rule
14 is one example of the manner in which a change in the procedural rules
caused a change in the jurisdictional test. Id. at 418-21.
Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d
804 (2d Cir. 1959). Rule 14 operates only when the defendant attempts to invoke the secondary liability of a third party in the event that the defendant is
held liable. Rule 14 does not apply if the defendant is attempting to cast the
sole blame upon the third-party defendant. Cass v. Brown, 41 F.R.D. 283, 284
(D. Colo. 1966). See also note 66 supra. Nor does Rule 14 apply if the thirdparty complaint brings up an entirely new issue that has no relationship to
the claim of the plaintiff. Lincoln Gateway Realty Co. v. Carri Craft Inc., 53
F.R.D. 303 (W.D. Mo. 1971). Even if there is a valid third party complaint, the
court retains discretion not to hear the claim. Cass v. Brown, 41 F.R.D. 284 (D.
Colo. 1966).
Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964); Gebhardt v. Edgar, 251 F.
Supp. 678 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst.
of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
King v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 274 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962).
Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959), pointed out that the trial judge had
discretion as to whether to retain a third-party claim when the original claim
granting jurisdiction had been settled. Id. at 807. Since that case the
Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs suggests that the
federal judge exercise caution in continuing to hear a non-federal claim when
the federal claim has been terminated. However, some factors may justify
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cally approved it-despite similar arguments concerning the limited nature of federal jurisdiction that conceivably could be made
against this long-standing expansion of jurisdiction."'
A more questionable variation of the basic third-party action
occurs when a defendant attempts to bring an additional claim
against a third-party defendant with the claim for indemnity.
With a few exceptions, lower federal courts have held that no
ancillary jurisdiction attaches to an additional claim by a defendant against a third-party defendant." 2 This section will first examine a sampling of cases in which this approach was followed by
the courts. It will then examine the exceptional cases where the
courts have allowed the additional claim to be brought in, and,
finally, consider whether Kroger has cast any doubt upon the allowance of the claim in the "exceptional" case.
A.

The General Rule

In United States v. Scott," 3 the Federal Housing Authority
(FHA) brought an action against individuals who had failed to
make a federally insured payment on a home improvement loan.
The defendants' third-party complaint sought indemnity, alleged
fraud on the part of the salesman who procured the note, and
additionally alleged that the premises had been improperly repaired, with resulting damages of $3,000."4 Although the court recognized the validity of the impleader claim under Rule 14(a), it
rejected the other claim: "[T] o allow impleader for the recovery of
damages would not serve the purposes of impleader, for it would
introduce a completely separate and distinct cause of action involving the issue of whether or not [the third party defendant]
made the repairs improperly."" 5 The court reasoned that even

110.

111.

112.
113.
114.
115.

retaining non-federal third party claims. WaRGHT, supra note 10, § 1444, at
236-37.
If the primary claim is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action or for
some other reason that reaches the merits, the judge has discretion to continue to hear the third-party claim. If on the other hand it has been dismissed
because there is no subject matter jurisdiction over the primary claim, then
the third-party claim must also be dismissed if it is based on ancillary jurisdiction, unless it can be supported by independent jurisdictional grounds.
See WRiGHT, supra note 10, § 1444, at 237. See also Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction-Rule 14-Disposition of Third Party Claim When the Primary Claim
Has Been Dismissed, 23 S.C. L. REv. 261 (1971).
437 U.S. 375. "The ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts... has been
said to include cases that involve multiparty practice, such as ... impleader
..... " Id. at 375 n.18.
See § I of text infra.
18 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326.
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though the impleader and the main claim arise out of a single factual setting, the defendant cannot assert a claim against the third
party under Rule 14 which attempts to do more than pass on liability.116
A similar result was reached where the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant corporation had wrongfully interfered with a contractual right of the plaintiff because of the defendant's use of a testimonial in a national trade magazine." 7 The defendant filed a
third-party complaint against the advertising agency that had prepared the advertising which contained the disputed testimonial.
The court found that the third-party complaint's first count was
proper because it asked that the advertiser be held liable to the
defendant for any sum that the court found the defendant owed
the plaintiff."18 However, the court found the second count improper because the defendant had requested consequential damages incurred because of the loss of the plaintiff's business. That
claim was entirely separate from the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant, even though it arose out of the same general facts,"19
and therefore could not be allowed under Rule 14.120
B.

Allowing the Extra Claim

The cases allowing the extra claim begin with Noland v. Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. 121 The plaintiff corporation brought an
action for breach of contract against Noland because Noland had
contracted to supply a 500,000 gallon water tank, but later failed to
perform when it realized that it had mistakenly submitted an estimate for a 300,000 gallon tank. The plaintiff sued for $13,065-the
increased cost incurred in obtaining the tank from a different
source. Noland fied a third-party action against Graver Tank alleging that the bidding mistake had actually been made by the third116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
C.W. Humphrey Co. v. Security Alum. Co., 31 F.R.D. 41 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
Id. at 44.
In neither case was there any discussion of the possible existence of an independent basis of jurisdiction over the additional claim.
120. See also Gebhardt v. Edgar, 251 F. Supp. 678, 680-81 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (in a
wrongful death action, the defendant filed a third party action; the claim for
indemnity was allowed, but the claim for the defendant's own damages was

disallowed).
121. 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Ruckman & Hansen, Inc. v. Contracting &
Material Co., 328 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1964) (indemnity claim for $19,000; additional claim by the defendant against the third party for $10,000 allowed
under Rule 14(a) as arising from a single group of operative facts). Cf. Nortown Steel Supply Co., v. Northern Ind. Steel Supply Co., 315 F.2d 789 (8th
Cir. 1963) (extra claim for profits by defendant against third party allowed
without discussion of the jurisdictional issue; remanded for determination of
jurisdiction).
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party defendant. Noland sought to recover not only any amount
that it would have to pay to the plaintiff, but also the $4,000 profit
that1 22it would have made on the original transaction with the plaintiff.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff $13,065 and indemnified
the defendant by the same amount. The trial court refused, however, to grant the12 3defendant the additional $4,000 from the thirdparty defendant.
On appeal, the third-party defendant conceded that the additional claim for the profit was not complicated, it would not have
been particularly burdensome for the court to determine the issue,
hearing that claim would not have prolonged the litigation, and the
facts were basically the same as those presented in the impleader
claim. 124 The court recognized that there might be situations
where independent claims between a defendant and a third party,
even though growing out of the same transaction and involving the
right to an indemnity claim, could not easily be litigated without
serious complications. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion was that Rule 14 should be construed broadly and flexibly 1so
25
as to permit the court to exercise its discretion to hear the claim.
The significant aspects of this case are: (1) the court relied on
Rule 14 only; 12 6 (2) the court emphasized that the third-party defendant had already been made a party to the action;127 (3) the
court held that the trial court had discretion; 128 (4) the court noted
that the additional claim was appropriate because of the simplicity
of handling it;129 (5) in cases where it would not be particularly
easy to handle the additional claim, a court should be reluctant to
accept the claim; 30 and (6) since there was recovery on the basic
indemnity claim, the Fourth Circuit did not have to consider
claim if recovwhether a defendant could recover on the additional
13 1
ery on the basic indemnity claim was denied.
The other leading case allowing additional recovery on a thirdparty claim is Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co. 1 32 As a
result of a train-truck collision in Pennsylvania, an injured railroad
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

301 F.2d at 46.
Id.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal
Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. Prir. I- REv. 759, 773-75 (1972); 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 634 (1971); 50 TEx. L. REV. 537 (1972). See Annot., 12 A.L.R.
Fed. 877 (1972).
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employee sued his employer under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The railroad named the trucking company that
owned the truck as a third-party defendant, seeking indemnification under Rule 14. The railroad also made a separate claim for
damages to the train in the amount of $5,041.133 The third-party
defendant moved to dismiss the claim for train damage, arguing
that there was no diverse citizenship or federal question. The trial
jurisdiction and
court treated the claim as one involving pendent
34
exercised its discretion to dismiss the claim.
The trial court suggested that the railroad was trying to attach a
pendent claim for the railroad damage to its claim for indemnity,5
which was ancillary to the original FELA claim of the plaintiff.13
The court concluded that fairness to the parties would not be
served by allowing the additional claim. It particularly feared that
in view of the different standards of proof of the FELA and the
common law, allowing the extra claim for liability could damage
the plaintiff's claim.
On an interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed Noland,
but was unable to find any other decision in which a court had
squarely accepted the proposition that Rule 14 applied to claims
for anything other than indemnity:
Although we are sympathetic with much of the rationale in Noland and
find the result therein desirable, we too must reject the view that Rule 14
[in and of itself] permits recovery of damages in excess of
or different
136
from that sought by the original plaintiff in his main claim.

Although the Third Circuit rejected the reasoning of Noland, it
did not reject the Noland result. The court was convinced that
"both as a matter of policy and of logic, Erie should be permitted to
assert its separate claim .... assuming that the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties would be
served.' 137 The court found a basis for its conclusion in Rule 18 (a),
as amended in 1966.138 That amendment allows a party asserting a
third-party claim to join "as many claims.., as he has against an
opposing party." The Third Circuit reasoned that this amendment
was intended to permit the inclusion of claims like Erie's. Yet the
court recognized that there must still be a jurisdictional basis for
the additional claim. 1 39 If a claim is totally unrelated to the indem133. 438 F.2d at 64.
134. Id. at 63.
135. Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 48 F.R.D. 442 (W.D. Pa. 1970). The court
pungently suggested: "Once the camel gets its nose under the tent, we would
have to make room for the entire animal, including its pendent fleas." Id. at
444.
136. 438 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 68.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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nity claim, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis;
otherwise the claim would be improperly brought in federal court.
If, however, the factual relationship between the additional claim
and the basic third-party claim is close, the court argued that the
additional claim should come within the ancillary jurisdiction of
the court in the same fashion as a compulsory counterclaim. 140
The Third Circuit concluded that the railroad's separate claim survived, whether it was treated as ancillary to the main claim or as
ancillary to the third-party claim. 14 1 The Court concluded that
Rule 14(a) read in conjunction with Rule 18(a) gave the defendant
a proper procedural route for asserting its affirmative claim for
damages. Since the claims were related, no independent basis of
jurisdiction was required to hear the additional $5,041 claim. While
the court would have preferred express language in an amended
Rule allowing this additional claim under the same circumstances
as a compulsory counderclaim,142 it believed the same goal had
been accomplished by the amendment to Rule 18(a).
Even if ancillary jurisdiction supports the additional claim, a
number of questions remain. First, if there is jurisdiction, must
the court hear the additional claim, or does it have the inherent
discretion not to accept the claim? Second, if it does accept the
claim, either mandatorily or voluntarily, may it order a separate
trial under Rule 42 to guard against jury prejudice or confusion?
Third, if the additional claim does fit within ancillary jurisdiction
by its relation to the other claims, does the failure of the defendant
to raise that claim constitute splitting a cause of action, just as the
failure to raise a compulsory counterclaim would? Schwab indicated that the trial court had no discretion and had to hear the additional claim. 143 Such a decision ties the hands of the trial court
and unreasonable restricts its flexibility. The Noland court, on the
144
other hand, recognized the discretionary power of the courts.
The Schwab court, however, did emphasize the court's power to
order separate trials, 145 thus eliminating the concern over the likelihood of jury concusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief.
140. Id. at 68-71, relying principally on the comments of Professor Wright at the
1966 Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit. See 42 F.R.D. 437, 560 (1968).
See also Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil Procedure,35 F.PRD. 317,
335 (1964).
141. Id. at 70. For a case emphasizing the requirement of a valid third-party complaint for indemnity to support an additional third-party claim, see Donaldson v. United States Steel, 53 F.R.D. 228 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
142. For another supporter of an amendment in the rule to permit such an additional claim, see Fraser, 33 F.R.D. 27, supra note 101, at 39.
143. 438 F.2d at 71-72.
144. 301 F.2d at 51.
145. Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 72 (1971).
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Should the court's analysis differ if the original claim is based
on an exclusive federal statute and not on diversity? That situation was presented to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. United
Pacific Insurance Co. 146 The plaintiff had furnished equipment to
the Discount Company for work performed under a contract with
the United States Department of Agriculture. During construction,
Discount failed to carry out its obligations and its surety, United
Pacific Insurance, was forced to assume control of the project. Pursuant to federal statute the United States brought an action for the
benefit of the plaintiff Payne against United Pacific.147 When the
defendant learned that the Discount Company and its principal officers were transferring assets, United Pacific brought a third-party
action against them, requesting specific performance of the indemnity agreement, an injunction against the transfer of any assets,
for any amounts
and judgment against the third-party defendants
48
found owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.1
Prior to trial the defendant United Pacific settled with the plaintiff for $2,162 and completed the construction project at a cost of
$145,000. Thus United Pacific had liquidated its claims against the
third parties, and its suit for specific performance of the indemnity
agreement became a suit for damages. The trial court held that the
indemnity agreement was valid and awarded United Pacific
150
$145,777 and attorney's fees. 149 The Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff's original claim was
properly in federal court by virtue of the federal statute, while the
third-party indemnification claim for $2162 was based strictly on
ancillary jurisdiction since both the main claim and the impleader
151
involved the same facts and arose out of the same transaction.
No decision, however, had expanded the concept of ancillary jurisdiction broadly enough to cover the additional claims. The Noland court had emphasized that the addition of the $4,000 claim
would involve substantially the same facts, would not complicate
or prolong the action, and would have a close nexus to the principal claim.'5 2 But in United Pacific the claim for $145,000 would involve different facts from those in the $2,000 claim, prolong the
litigation, and complicate the proceedings. Even though the claim
arose from the same background as the construction contracts, it
146.
147.
148.
149.

472 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 793.
Id.

150.

Id.

151. The court recognized that the settlement of the original claim prior to trial
did not terminate the power of the trial court to decide the ancillary thirdparty claims. Id. at 794 n.4. See Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
152. 301 F.2d at 50.

1980]

ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

did not bear a close connection to the primary claim. In Schwab,
the court had relied on Rule 18(a), since the claims were factually
and logically related and there was a strong nexus between the
principal and the disputed claim. Without close ties between the
additional claim and the original suit, 153 the claim for specific performance of the indemnity agreement, which had become essentially a suit for $145,000 in damages, "can hardly be considered to
have arisen out of the same transaction as the original $2,000
suit,' 54 nor could it be described as auxiliary or subordinate. The
mere fact that it came from the same operative core of facts was
not a satisfactory connection. The Ninth Circuit rejected "the suggestion that a federal court can assume jurisdiction over the claim
for total indemnification merely because it is ancillary to a proper
ancillary claim for liability-over.' 5 5 Although the original claim in
United Pacific rested on a federal statute, that difference did not
demand a different result. 156 It was the ancillary claim, not the ju153. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, in contrast to the decision of the Third
Circuit in Schwab, the additional claim should be allowed only if it was ancillary to the principal claim, and not if it was merely ancillary to the ancillary
third-party claim. Id. at 795 n.9.
154. Id. at 795-96. Accord, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American State
Bank, 372 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1967) (primary claim involving a payment bond
was based on the Miller Act; third-party complaint rested on a separate performance bond from the same background).
155. Id. at 796.
156. The federal tax statutes provide the context for an intervesting problem
when the defendant asserts an additional claim against the third-party. For
example, in Stiber v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the plaintiff
brought an action to recover $80.95 from the Internal Revenue Service, alleging it had been improperly assessed a penalty of $26,748.37 for failure to collect and pay Social Security withholding taxes due from a corporation. The
Government filed a counterclaim for $26,667.42, the balance of the assessment. The Government also filed a third-party complaint, joining two other
individuals as third-party defendants on the grounds that they might be liable to the Government for all or part of the plaintiff's claim since they had
served as the general manager and treasurer of the corporation. In other
words, if the plaintiff prevails, the third-party may be liable to the Government for part of the $80 claim. The court agreed that if the plaintiff did not
recover the $80.95 from the defendant, the defendant could not recover either
the $80.95 or the additional amount from the third-party. Id. at 670. See note
110 supra. However, the difficult question was whether the government could
proceed against the third-party defendant to collect the $26,667 if it were allowed to proceed to collect the $80.
The Stiber court's analysis paralleled that of Schwab. Rule 14 did not permit recovery of damages in excess of those sought by the original claim.
However, Rule 14 must be read in the light of Rule 18. The claim, if treated as
ancillary, need not have any independent basis of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that it was "not permitting an entirely separate and independent
claim to be maintained against a third party defendant under Rule 14." Id. at
676. But see United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc. 380 F. 2d 749 (5th Cir.
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risdiction granting claim, that failed the test of limited federal jurisdiction.
C.

Summary

Before an additional claim by a defendant against a third party
can be considered by a federal court, there must be a valid thirdparty claim under Rule 14(a). The impleader must initally seek
recovery from the third party on an indemnity, contribution, or related theory. Rule 14 itself does not address the question of when
additional claims may be considered. With the exception of Noland, courts have adopted the view that Rule 14 by itself is not
broad enough to allow the additional claim. Unless an expansive
view is taken of Rule 14 and of a federal court's flexibility in determining ancillary jurisdiction, the Noland approach is not justified.
The draftsmen of the Federal Rules, during one of their periodic
reforms, could easily have incorporated the Noland approach in
Rule 14, as some courts have suggested. But even if such a provision were included, jurisdiction over the additional claim would
still have to satisfy the mandates of article III. As pointed out in
Kroger, a provision in the Federal Rules granting jurisdiction is
only as broad as article III allows. Therefore, adding the additional
phrase would not necessarily solve the problem.
Rule 18(a) permits a defendant with a valid third-party claim to
join with it as many other claims as he has. Rule 18(a), however,
does not answer the constitutional question of jurisdiction. Both
commentators and courts have suggested that the additional claim
should be allowed under Rule 18(a) only if it qualifies under a test
1967). The plaintiff's claim for $80 was identical to the government's claim for
$80 and was a proper third-party claim under Rule 14.
The court focused on three factors in deciding that the third-party claim
for $26,667 should be allowed under Rule 18(a). Note the advisory note to
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) at 39 F.R.D. 86-87 (1966). First, Rule 14 is "remedial and
should be liberally construed" to avoid multiple actions as far as possible.
The alternative, if the third parties were not joined and the plaintiff prevailed,
would be for the government to bring a separate lawsuit against these other
individuals. Second, the claims derived from a single group of operative
facts, and the evidence for the additional third-party complaint would be the
same as for plaintiff's complaint. Third, since the plaintiff was the comptroller of the corporation and the third-party defendants were the general manager and treasurer, the court should allow third party actions against these
responsible officers.
See also McGee v. United States, 62 F.R.D. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Abrams v.
United States, 52 F.R.D. 578 (S.D. W.Va. 1972); Crompton-Richmond Co., Factors v United States, 273 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. S.E. Mortgage Co. v.
Mullens, 514 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975) (an entirely separate and independent
claim cannot be maintained against a third party under rule 14 even though it
may arise out of the same general facts as the primary jurisdiction-granting
complaint). See also 3 MOORE'S, supra note 76, 14.07 [1], at 208-09.
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analogous to the one employed for counterclaims. 5 7v If the additional claim can satisfy the standard for a compulsory counterclaim, it should be allowed under ancillary jurisdiction. If,
however, it is more like a permissive counterclaim under Rule
13(b), then, like a permissive counterclaim, it must be supported
by an independent basis of jurisdiction. Schwab is the best example of the "compulsory" additional claim: the claim involved the
same facts and the same witnesses, it would not greatly complicate
the work of the court, and a different approach could result in split157. See note 140 & accompanying text supra. Another recent case drawing an
analogy to compulsory and permissive counterclaims is Nishimatsu Constr.
Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F. 2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1975). Nishimatsu had subcontracted the engineering studies on a railroad project. Payments to Nishimatsu were to be made by means of a letter of credit obtained from the
Houston National Bank by the contractor and issued in favor of Nishimatsu.
Nishimatsu brought this action against the bank because of its refusal to
honor drafts submitted periodically against the letter of credit. The bank
brought a third-party action against the corporation and the individual who
had arranged the entire construction contract, alleging that under an agreement executed in connection with the letter of credit the corporation and the
individual were obligated to reimburse the bank for any sums paid to Nishimatsu pursuant to the letter of credit. The bank also joined a claim against
the corporation and the individual on the promissory note. The third-party
defendants did not file any responsive pleadings. Subsequently, the plaintiff
and the defendant settled the controversy for $17,5000. After several continuances, the bank's motion for a default judgment against the third parties was
granted. Id. at 1204. The court held a hearing on damages and entered judgment for $82,000.
The Fifth Circuit first agreed that there was ancillary jurisdiction over the
impleader action with respect to the contract executed in connection with the
letter of credit. However, the claim against the third parties on the promissory note had to be treated differently. The court noted that although Rule
18(a) permits these claims to be joined, a federal jurisdictional basis must
exist. Although it apparently would have been possible to establish diversity
of citizenship between the defendant and the third-parties (unlike Noland
and Schwab), nothing in the record expressly indicated diversity.
The Nishimatsu court stated that the other means of establishing jurisdiction is for the claim to fall within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court. "A
claim is ancillary 'when it bears a logical relationship to the aggregate core of
operative facts which make up the main claim."' Id. at 1205. The additional
claim did not bear a logical relationship to the main claim or to the impleader
claim. Without using the terminology, the court drew an analogy to compulsory and permissive counterclaims. Since the bank's claim on the promissory note was closer to a permissive counterclaim, there must be an
independent jurisdictional basis, whereas in Schwab and Noland the additional claim was closer to a compulsory counterclaim and therefore was subject to the ancillary jurisdiction of the court. But see North Am. Corp. v.
Halliburton Co., 71 F.R.D. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (following a counterclaim by
the defendant, the plaintiff fied a Rule 14(a) claim for indemnification and a
separate contractual claim against a party brought in by the plaintiff under
rule 14(b) as a third party; the claim was allowed under Rule 18(a) with little
attention given to the compulsory nature of it).
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ting a cause of action. On the other hand, United Pacific had additional claims that went far beyond the request for indemnity: the
claims raised additional issues, had limited connection with each
other, and would have aggravated the work of the court. 158
Once a court determines it has the jurisdiction to hear an additional third-party claim, it may then question whether it has the
discretion not to hear the claim.'5 9 Both the Schwab and Noland
decisions suggest that a court has no such discretion. This rule
fails to allow a court to use its power to break off an issue that
technically falls within the rules, but serves only to complicate the
federal proceedings. In exercising its discretion, a court should
consider whether there is an alternative forum, whether the defense of res judicata might be appropriate, and whether other
problems would result from dismissing the lawsuit. Even if the
court retains the additional claim, it may wish to conduct separate
trials and sever the additional claim under Rule 42, either because
the facts are not that closely related or, as the trial court suggested
160
in Schwab, because there are different theories involved.
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Kroger that the mere fact
that a joinder procedure is permitted under a procedural rule does
not make it constitutional suggests that Schwab and Noland went
too far in allowing an additional third-party claim and particularly
in denying a trial court its discretion to hear vel non additional
third-party claims. On the other hand, nothing in the language of
the Court suggests that an additional "compulsory" claim is not
permitted by article III. This situation is similar to the compulsory
counterclaim, except that it involves a closely related claim by the
defendant going against the third-party, instead of back against the
plaintiff. The dangers the Kroger court saw in allowing one party
to proceed against a party it could not have sued directly are not
present in the additional third-party claim situation because the
third party is already in the lawsuit on a valid claim. Yet the Court
did speak of an ancillary and dependent claim versus a new and
independent claim. This distinction may suggest that the additional claim would not be allowed even though it comes from the
same core of operative facts, because it is a new and independent
claim. However, this argument could be made as to the basic indemnity claim under Rule 14, and the Court authorized that procedure. Therefore, although opposing arguments are available,
158. 472 F.2d at 795.
159. A case emphasizing the discretionary aspect of a court's decision to hear an
additional claim by a defendant against a third-party defendant is Keister v.
Laurel Mt. Dev. Corp. 70 F.R.D. 10, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
160. Supporting the use under Rule 42(b) of separate trials in third-party actions
is United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 556 (1951). See generally
WRIGHT, supra note 10, §§ 2388-89.
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Kroger does not automatically compel the reversal of cases such
as Schwab. It simply makes their extension less likely.161
V. THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT v. THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
In contrast to the preceding section in which the Federal Rule
was silent, the fourth sentence of Rule 14(a) allows,162 and indeed
requires, a third-party defendant to assert his counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff "as provided in Rule 13." By tying
into Rule 13, this provision adopts the compulsory/permissive distinction made in that rule. The large body of case law interpreting
Rule 13 allows a court to hear a compulsory counterclaim under its
ancillary jurisdiction, but requires an independent basis of jurisdiction before a court can hear a permissive counterclaim under
Rule 13(b). 163 Thus, this approach applies when a third-party
defendant fies a counterclaim against the defendant and thirdparty defendant.
This distinction is demonstrated by the case of Weber v.
Weber' 64 where, following a fatal automobile accident in Philadelphia, a diversity action was brought by the executor of the decedent. The defendant brought a third-party action against another
participant in the collision. The third-party defendant filed a counterclaim against the third-party plaintiff, seeking damages for his
own personal injuries, for expenses incurred in caring for his injured wife, and for loss of consortium.165 In refusing to dismiss the
counterclaim against the defendant, the court rejected the view
that the Rule 13(a) provision for compulsory counterclaims had to
be interpreted so narrowly that the "same transaction" would be
limited to the third-party complaint for contribution. 166 Instead,
the court adopted the broader and preferred interpretation of Rule
13(a) that a counterclaim is compulsory if it bears a logical relationship to an opposing claim and arises out of the same basic con161.

162.

163.

164.
165.
166.

See, e.g., Skinner v. American Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D. Iowa 1978):
"recent Supreme Court pronouncements dictate a conservative approach discouraging the exercise of pendent jurisdiction despite the loss in judicial
economy.... ." Id.
'The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter
called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party
plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counter-claims against the
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as
provided in Rule 13." FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a).
See WRiGHT, supra note 10, § 1414, at 69-81; id. § 1423, at 119-23. Even though
Rule 14(a) is drafted in mandatory language, courts retain the power to sever
a compulsory counterclaim brought by a third-party defendant. Id. § 1456, at
302-03.
44 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 230.
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troversy between the parties. 167 Here the counterclaim, which was
independent because it was for the third party's own damages, did
contain many of the same basic factual issues; it was an offshoot of
the basic controversy between the parties; and prosecution of the
entire1 68matter would aid in fairness, convenience, and judicial economy.
Additionally, the counterclaim should be deemed compulsory because if it were not allowed, subsequent consideration of
the claim in another court conceivably would be barred by principles of collateral estoppel. Finally, and perhaps inconsistently, the
court emphasized that although Rule 13(a) does not require the
filing of a counterclaim when there is an existing suit pending in
another court, that exception is only an option available to the
counterclaimant. 169 In this case, the counterclaimant had elected
to bring the claim into federal court, rather than to have it heard in
state court where an action was pending. Therefore, although the
claim by the third party against the defendant ostensibly satisfied
the test of a compulsory counterclaim, it was not truly compulsory
because the third party retained the option.
This settled interpretation of the fourth sentence of Rule 14(a)
will not be affected by the Court's decision in Kroger. Both the
majority and the dissent in Kroger emphasized that compulsory
counterclaims are one instance in which ancillary jurisdiction undoubtedly applies. Even Rule 82 does not interfere with this conclusion since compulsory counterclaims under ancillary
jurisdiction have a basis dating back to the Moore decision in 1926.
If the counterclaimant is the third-party defendant rather than
the defendant, the action may be somewhat further removed from
the primary claim, i.e., the counterclaim by the third party may
relate more to the third-party claim than to the original complaint
filed by the plaintiff. However, underlying it all must be the same
basic transaction. If the claim is too unrelated to the main claim,
the court does retain the power-in examining judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness-to rule that a particular counterclaim
by the third party is not compulsory but under those elusive standards is actually permissive. If treated as permissive, the counterclaim may still be based on an independent basis of jurisdiction
and thus in theory can be heard as an element of the original action. This potential confusion is unlikely to be an actual problem,
for the trial court retains the power under Rule 42(b) to sever
claims to avoid prejudice or to achieve judicial convenience or
economy. Finally, even if the claim by the third-party defendant
167. See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1961).
168. 44 F.R.D. at 229-30.
169. Id. at 237.
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against the defendant is compulsory, the court has the same power
to handle that claim separately. 170
VI.

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT v. PLAINTIFF

The sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) permits the third-party defendant to assert any claim against the plaintiff "arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff."'' 1 This language
closely parallels the compulsory counterclaim language of Rule
13(a). However, despite that similarity, the rule is not compulsory-it is specifically cast in permissive terms, allowing the thirdparty defendant to assert it if he wishes. The important question is
whether such a claim by the third-party defendant back against
the plaintiff' 72 arises under ancillary jurisdiction or whether an independent basis of jurisdiction is required. A third-party claim
which would be permissive if it arose under Rule 13 is authorized
under Rule 18 (a) since it is a claim by the third party against an
opposing party. In that case Rule 82 clearly requires that there be
an independent basis of jurisdiction. However, it is not as clear
whether ancillary jurisdiction covers a claim by a third party back
against the plaintiff that falls within the language of the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a), and thus within the Rule 13 definition of a compulsory counterclaim.
The early cases refused to allow a claim by the third-party back
against the plaintiff. 7 3 The concern was that where both the third
party and the plaintiff were citizens of the same state, permitting
this type of claim could promote collusion. For instance, an original defendant could enter into collusive agreement with a third
party and bring in that third party who could then claim back
against the original plaintiff in a forum where the third party could
not have initiated suit for lack of diversity. Since the plaintiff
could not go directly against the third party, the third party was
not permitted to bring this claim back against the plaintiff under
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
A 1948 amendment to Rule 14 made a significant change in the
170. See note 99 & accompanying text supra.
171. "The third-party defendant may also assert any laim against the plaintiff
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
172. The courts have not been consistent in the terminology applied to such a
claim, for it is neither a cross-claim nor a counterclaim. See WRulTrr, supra
note 10, § 1444, at 234; id. § 1458 at 310. See, e.g., United States v. Raefsky, 19
F.R.D. 355 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Regardless of the language used by the court, in
this article the claim will be described as "a claim by the third-party back
against the plaintiff."
173. See Morris, Wheeler & Co., v. Rust Eng'r Co., 4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945).
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right of a third party to file a claim back against a plaintiff. As the
first case interpreting the new rule indicated, 174 the initial question
to be asked is whether the requirements of the sixth sentence are
satisfied. That is, does the claim by the third party against the
plaintiff arise out of "the transaction or occurrence that is the sub1 5
ject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the [defendant] ?'
Frequently attempts to use the sixth sentence have failed on this
threshold question. For example, in Brown v. First National
Bank,176 the claim by the plaintiff against the defendant bank was
for certain sums paid out of an escrow account. The bank impleaded the third party to whom the sums had been paid. The
third party filed a claim against the plaintiff asking for a complete
accounting of a well-drilling partnership formerly existing between
the plaintiff and the third party. According to the third party, the
underlying cause of the litigation was not the escrow agreement at
the bank, but rather the breakup of77the partnership of which the
escrow agreement was only a part.
The court, however, concluded that the plaintiff's claim against
a defendant bank was not based on the partnership, but was based
78
on an escrow agreement between the partnership and the bank.
Thus, the original claim was limited to the escrow agreement. Although the court recognized that the rules were meant to expedite
the handling of claims, the language in the sixth sentence of Rule
14 had been included to facilitate the joining of claims that had
similar or identical questions of fact. The rule was not designed to
enable two lawsuits to be converted into one, which would have
occurred if the claim back against the plaintiff for the accounting
had been allowed. The mere identity of parties in the lawsuit did
not constitute a sufficient basis for allowing such a claim.
Another case illustrative of the scope of the sixth sentence is
Finkel v. United States,179 a federal tax case in which the plaintiff
sued for cancellation of a penalty tax assessment. The Government entered a third-party complaint against an individual for payment of essentially the same assessment, asserting that the
individual was sufficiently in control of a corporation to be found
liable to the Government for tax status. The third party filed an
action back against the plaintiff, alleging an indemnity agreement
covering any taxes he might pay. Although the court would have
been willing to adopt the principle of ancillary jurisdiction in this
174. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Sttomvaart-Maatschappij,
9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
175. Id. at 558.
176. 14 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
177. Id. at 340.
178. Id. at 340-41.
179. 385 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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instance, 180 it found that the sixth sentence, the threshold barrier,
was not satisfied. 18 1 The court required a logical relationship between claims, though not an absolute identity of factual background.182 The logical relationship did not exist because the
claims of the third party poses issues irrelevant to the one
presented in the original claim. The main dispute concerned who
was in sufficient control of the corporation so as to be liable to the
government, whereas the third-party claims centered on the alleged fraud. The third-party claims centered on the alleged fraud
and misrepresentation when the indemnification agreement was
signed. 183 Additionally, the court mentioned that there would be
no prejudice to the third party since a state action on these claims
was already pending. This latter reason by itself would justify the
exercise of discretion in refusing to take the case even if the sixth
sentence of Rule 114(a) were satisfied.
In contrast with these cases, some courts have concluded that
184
the claim back by the third party is appropriate under the rule.
The leading case interpreting the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) to
allow the claim back by the third-party is Heintz & Co. v. Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. 185 Kerr, the office manager of a
branch of the plaintiff corporation, had opened a bank account in
the plaintiffs name. The plaintiff sued the bank, alleging the bank
had negligently permitted the account to be opened in the company's name and had permitted Kerr to withdraw checks without
the plaintiff's authorization. The bank sought liability over against
Kerr. Kerr then filed a claim for $5,199 back against the plaintiff
under the sixth sentence of rule 14(a) for services and materials
furnished to the plaintiff in connection with the establishment of
18 6
the branch office.
The Pennsylvania federal court recognized that it had two questions to resolve: (1) whether the claim came within the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) and (2) whether an independent jurisdictional
basis was needed for a claim that did come within the sixth sentence. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in
Moore which emphasized that "transaction" is a word of flexible
180. The indemnity agreement did not involve a federal question, and since both
the plaintiff and the third party were citizens of New York, there was no diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 335.
181. Id. at 336.
182. Id.
183. For another case where the sixth sentence was not satisfied, see United
States v. P. J. Walker Constr. Co., 24 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
184. E.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486
(D. Neb. 1965).
185. 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
186. Id. at 172.
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meaning which required that the claims of the parties have a logical relationship and required that the court look to the factual issues, the nature of the controversy and considerations of fairness,
convenience, and justice. 187 In contrast to the Brown decision, the
Pennsylvania court here concluded that the Kerr claims arose out
188
of the transaction from which the plaintiff's claim originated.
Rather than limit the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim to the
checking account in the plaintiff's name, which would have been
similar to the escrow account in Brown, the court concluded that
the crucial transaction was the establishment of a branch office
and Kerr's appointment and conduct as manager of that branch
office. 189 Properly viewed, the transaction was the entire relationship between the plaintiff and Kerr, specifically the services rendered by Kerr and the payment received by him. Therefore, the
answer to the first question was yes, the claim back did come
within the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a). 19 0
Even though a particular claim back by the third party against
the plaintiff does fall within the sixth sentence of Rule 14, the
courts have recognized their discretionary power to dismiss the
claim under appropriate circumstances. 191 Moreoever, a court is
still empowered by Rule 42 to hold a separte hearing for a particuId. at 172-73. See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
30 F.R.D. at 172.
Id.
For material on jurisdiction, see the material accompanying notes 193-208 infra.
191. For example, in Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1970) plaintiffs
brought an action based on diversity for personal injuries suffered in a collision between their outboard motor boat and a barge owned by defendant.
The defendant impleaded the company that operated the barge. Towing company fied a claim against the plaintiff, seeking contribution from the plaintiff
for any sum adjudged in favor of the defendant and against the third-party.
The court refused to allow such a claim against the plaintiff for contribution
because the claim was not mature under relevant state law or Rule 13(e). It
also refused to allow the claim under Rule 14; the definition of the claim had
to be treated the same under Rule 13 and 14 because the language of Rule
13(a) and 14(a) (6) is almost identical. However, there is a difference the
court did not point out: Rule 13(a) ties into Rule 14(e) which refers to a matured claim, while there is no such "mature" language in Rule 14. On the
other hand, the basic Rule 14(a) provision refers to a person "who is or may
be liable to the defendant." In the same fashion where the third party brings
in a fourth party, the language is a party "who is or may be liable;" instead,
the sixth sentence refers to "any claim against the plaintiff."
Therefore the difference in the language allowed the court to hold that the
sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) can refer only to a matured claim; in this instance there was not yet a matured claim since nothing had been paid by the
third party. Obviously this rather forced reading is contrary to convenience,
efficiency, and judicial economy. Apparently there was no question concerning subject matter jurisdiction since the amount in controversy was more
than $10,000 and it appears that the plaintiff and the third party were of di187.
188.
189.
190.
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lar claim to promote efficiency or to prevent prejudice, even if the
court concludes that the claim falls within the ambit of the rule
and exercises its discretion to accept the claim.192
The second question that must be answered is that of jurisdiction. 193 Even if the requirements of Rule 14(a) are met, the court
must have jurisdiction over the claim by the third party back
against the plaintiff. If there is no independent subject matter jurisdiction, 194 the question is whether a claim that is proper under
verse states. The court may simply have been using its inherent discretion
not to accept the claim even though subject matter jurisdiction did exist.
192. See note 160 & accompanying text supra. An interesting example of the discretionary aspect of claims back against the plaintiff is found in the admiralty
area. In Cavalerri v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
rehearingdenied, 190 F. Supp. 801 (1961), a longshoreman brought an action
against a ship owner for injuries, and the ship owner impleaded the stevedoring company that had employed the longshoreman for indemnity in the event
that it was held liable to the defendant, arguing that this liability would have
been caused by the negligence of the plaintiff himself. The trial court rejected the claim because there were no conceivable facts upon which the
third party defendant could recover. In addition, the doctrine of comparative
negligence in admiralty cases persuaded the court that the third party should
not be able to assert the claims back against the plaintiff. The claim obviously came within the sixth sentence of Rule 14(a) and there was federal
jurisdiction as an admiralty claim, but the court exercised its discretion.
However, the identical issue was decided differently the following year in
the same court. Malfitano v. King Line Ltd., 198 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Again the third party stevedoring company brought a claim against the plaintiff longshoreman alleging that the plaintiff in his capacity as a hatch boss
was under a duty to perform his work not to cast liability upon his employer;
that if the third party were judged liable, the liability would have been due to
the plaintiff's negligence. The court emphasized the goal of modern pleading
to try all claims in one action and to avoid separate piecemeal trials. Since all
interested parties were before the court, earlier court, the judge was unwilling to be a "bold prophet" and predict with certainty the future law in the
field of maritime negligence.
The dispute was resolved by the Second Circuit which dismissed the
claim by the stevedoring company back against the plaintiff longshoreman.
Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-OG Australieninie Wilhelmsens Dampskibs-Aktieselskab, 332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964). Permitting this burden to be passed
back to the plaintiff would improperly place the occupational risks on the
longshoreman and undermine the admiralty rule of comparative negligence.
For this public policy reason the claim would not be allowed. Subsequent
decisions have followed this determination in not allowing these particular
claims. Arico v. Cie. De Navegacion Transoceanique, 409 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1969); McLaughlin v. Trelleborgs Angfaryges A/B, 408 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969). Neither the law nor public policy authorizes
recovery by the stevedoring company against the longshoreman.
193. On the question of jurisdiction over this claim back against the plaintiff, see
3 MooRE's, supra note 74, § 14.27[2], at 14-574 to -577 (supporting ancillary
jurisdiction and reversing his earlier position); WmGrT, supra note 10, § 1444,
at 232-34, id. § 1458, at 309-11 (supporting ancillary jurisdiction).
194. E.g., Borden Co. v. Sylk, 42 F.R.D. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (federal jurisdiction
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Rule 14(a) falls within the ambit of ancillary jurisdiction. The
courts are sharply divided,195 and Kroger gives no guidance.
Those opinions rest on two reasons: first, the mutuality argument
that because the plaintiff needs an independent basis of jurisdiction to proceed against the third party, the third party needs an
independent basis to file a claim back against the plaintiff,196 and
second, Federal Rule 82 bars an interpretation of the 197
procedural
rules that would result in an expansion of jurisdiction.
The leading case allowing the third-party claim back against the
plaintiff as falling within ancillary jurisdiction is Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co. 198 Fuller was to supply
materials for the construction of a manufacturing plant to be operated by Revere. Fuller and Aetna executed performance bonds of
$14,000,000, obligating them to pay Revere any damages that would
result if Fuller failed to perform the contract. Revere brought an
action against Aetna on the surety bond in federal court alleging
that Fuller had breached warranties, been negligent, made false
representation, and failed to maintain a competent staff resulting
in a loss to Revere of over $2,000,000.199 Aetna fied a third-party
complaint against Fuller, alleging that Fuller had agreed to
idemnify Aetna for all losses sustained as a result of Aetna's suretyship. Fuller brought a claim back against Revere under rule
14(a) alleging that Revere had breached warranties, been negligent, made false representations, and been unjustly enriched by
the amount of $1,328,000.200 Since both the plaintiff and the third
party were incorporated in Maryland, there was no diversity of citizenship.
Although the theoretical basis for ancillary jurisdiction is well
settled, it is difficult to determine201the exact criteria to detect the
presence of ancillary jurisdiction.

195.

196.
197.
198.

199.
200.
201.

based upon the Clayton Act; the issue was whether the sixth sentence of
Rule 14(a) was satisfied).
See WIGHTr, supra note 10, § 1458 (1971). CompareJames King & Son, Inc. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 178 F. Supp. 146 (D.C.N.Y. 1959) with James
Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabod Bank Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 940 (1971) and Testa v. Winquist, 451 F. Supp. 388 (D.C. 1978).
E.g., Shverha v. Maryland Cas., 110 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1953). See also text
accompanying note 210 infra.
E.g., James King & Sons, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). See Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265, 276-82 (1971). See also Comment, 59 Ky. L.J. 506
(1970); Note, 49 N.C. L. REV. 503 (1971); Comment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1303
(1970); Comment, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 511. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 402
(1972).
426 F.2d at 710.
Id. at 711.
See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Great Lakes Rubber
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"[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of
the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses:
(1) that the same aggregate [is] the basis of both claims; or (2) that [the
claim and the original aggregate of facts] activates additional'20legal
rights
2
in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant.

One of the concerns of the Supreme Court in Moore was the
Court's "need to provide complete relief to the counterclaiming defendant."20 3 That need is equally important when the third party
is involuntarily brought into federal court.
Fuller's claim arose out of the aggregate of operative facts forming the basis of plaintiff Revere's claims; the relationship between
the main claim and Fuller's claim was beyond doubt. The construction contract was not completed on schedule. If Revere was
not responsible for the delay, Fuller was at least guilty of breach of
contract. An alternative for Fuller would have been to take the initiative in intervening and asserted its counterclaim against Revere
free of any jurisdictional impediment. 2 04 Since Fuller was brought
in involuntarily, he should still be able to bring his claim against
the plaintiff. The court concluded that its interpretation of Rule
14(a) was not expanding ancillary jurisdiction but was simply providing opportunities involving the doctrine, which was established
long before the adoption of the rule in 1938.205
Another frequently cited case holding that Rule 14(a) claims
falls within ancillary jurisdiction is Heintz & Co. v. Provident
Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co.. 206 The court treated the thirdparty claim the same as a compulsory counterclaim: identical requirements as to the same transaction, the same evidence, the
same factors of convenience and fairness. 207 The only difference is
that a compulsory counterclaim must be pleaded, whereas the
claim by the third party may be pleaded. To the court, this was a
distinction without a difference, since both were valid ancillary
claims. The Federal Rules have simply required one claim to be
pleaded, while the other claim may be pleaded at the discretion of
the party. Federal Rules do not make the claim ancillary-the case
law does.

202.
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.

Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961). See also notes 27-55
supra.
426 F.2d at 715.
Id.
FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). See Wmmrr, supranote 10, § 75, at 373. See also Fraser,
Ancillary Jurisdictionof Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May Be
Imparedif Not Joined,62 F.R.D. 483 (1974); Goldberg, supra note 28, at 421-24.
The impact of Kroger on ancillary jurisdiction over an intervening party
under Rule 24 is examined in Omni Dev., Inc. v. Porter, 459 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.
Fla. 1978).
426 F.2d at 717.
30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See notes 115-17 supra.
Id. at 174.
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The court had no particular fear about collusion. Collusion is a
possibility if a plaintiff tries to bring a claim against a third partya plaintiff would need only to seek an original defendant who
would cooperate. However, when the claim is brought by the third
party, the third party cannot collude with the defendant since the
plaintiff chooses the defendant. The third party has no means of
assuring cooperation by the plaintiff in suing the correct defendant, and therefore collusion between the defendant and the third
party is, if not impossible, very unlikely. The conclusion of the
court is consistent with the basic aims of the Federal Rules, for it
disposed of the entire controversy without violating Rule 82. The
mere broadening of the content of a single federal action is not the
same as the extension of federal power. The court was simply
making possible a more complete adjudication
of the issues in a
208
single case through new procedural devices.
It is in the area of a claim by the third-party back against the
plaintiff that the impact of Kroger is most uncertain. This type of
claim, like the claim in Kroger, is supported by a specific provision
in Rule 14(a). That provision is limited to a claim whose requirements are similar in nature to those of a compulsory counterclaim.
The courts must determine whether the third-party claim back
against the plaintiff is closer to a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a) and therefore within the ambit of ancillary jurisdiction,
or closer to the plaintiff's claim against the third party as involved
in Kroger, which does require an independent basis or jurisdiction.
One reason given for requiring independent subject matter jurisdiction in this situation is the risk of collusion. Yet the majority
in Kroger by its discussion of collusion strongly suggests that it
would not arise in a claim back against the plaintiff by the third
party.20 9 The claim in Kroger presents a greater risk of collusion
because the plaintiff selects the defendant. In contrast, the risk of
collusion is much less significant in the instance of a third-party
claim back against the plaintiff because the third party, hoping to
avoid the limits of federal jurisdiction, does not instruct a plaintiff
to sue a particular defendant, who will implead a third party, who
then files a claim under ancillary jurisdiction back against the
plaintiff. For this reason, Kroger may not have a great deal of sig208. Another case accepting ancillary jurisdiction in this instance is Mayer Paving
& Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (dictum). See also L & E Co. v. United States, 351
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1965); Finkel v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D.
486 (D. Neb. 1965); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
209. See text accompanying notes 88 supra.
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nificance in the area of third-party claims back against the plaintiff.
The older cases required independent subject matter jurisdiction
for such claims, reasoning that if it was required for claims by the
plaintiff against the third party, it should also be required for thirdparty claims back against the plaintiff. This mutuality requirement was generally discarded previously to Kroger210 and the
opinion of the Court, which ignored the requirement, should result
in the elimination of it, at least in this context.
If the reasoning of Kroger were to persuade a court in these
situations, ancillary jurisdiction would be slowly narrowed. Such a
development would be undesirable, particularly since the court retains the discretion to handle such claims separately or to refuse to
hear them at all. The risk to the litigants is not great and the risk
to the federal system, considered in the context of the federal policy of handling all claims in one action, is very small.
VII.

PLAINTIFF v. THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

Assuming that there is a valid claim by the plaintiff against the
defendant in federal court and that the defendant has correctly impleaded the third party, is the plaintiff then free to bring an action
against the third party? The seventh sentence of Rule 14(a)
clearly says yes, at least when the claim by the plaintiff against the
third party arises out of the same transaction. It is in this area that
the courts have had the greatest difficulty. Most of the courts
before 1978 determined that, despite the language of the seventh
sentence of Rule 14(a),211 an independent basis for jurisdiction
was required in addition to a claim arising out of the same transaction.2 12 A handful of cases, principally those arising in the Eight
Circuit, concluded that an independent basis of jurisdiction was
not required because by being limited to the same transaction as
required by the seventh sentence of Rule 14(a), the claim of the
plaintiff against the third party by definition fell within the ambit
of ancillary jurisdiction. 213 It was this dispute that the Supreme
210. See 3 MooRE's, supra note 74, § 14.27[2], at 14-574 to -577.
211. "The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs
claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counter-claim
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
212. E.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Better
Materials Corp., 556 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co. 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972).
213. E.g., Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F. 2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977); Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan. 1975); Olson v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965). See also note 218 infra.
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Court resolved in Kroger.
The Court concluded that such a claim by the plaintiff did not
fall within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. 2 14 To read the seventh sentence of Rule 14(a) in this way would be to violate the
admonition of Rule 82 that the rules not be used as a means of
expanding jurisdiction-fraud and collusion were present dangers,
the federal courts have only limited jurisdiction, and there was a
alternative forum in which the plaintiff could have brought all of
the claims originally.
The question after Kroger is whether there are instances in
which the plaintiff may proceed against the third party without any
independent basis of jurisdiction. That possibility was suggested
by the majority opinion. 215 For instance, the Court emphasized in
its opinion that defendant Omaha had been dismissed from the
lawsuit, and therefore, the claim by the plaintiff against the third
party was no longer an ancillary claim. Suppose, however, that the
defendent Omaha had remained in the lawsuit, with the plaintiff
asserting a claim against the defendant and against a third party.
Would the presence of the defendant in the ultimate lawsuit have
made a difference to the Court?2 16 The majority also emphasized
that the original claim by the plaintiff was a non-federal claim and
21 7
that she elected to bring her state-law claim in a federal court.
In electing federal court rather than state court, the plaintiff Kroger had to accept the limitations of federal jurisdiction. Kroger
does not reach the question of a claim which the plaintiff is compelled to assert in federal court because of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Would the Court in such a case allow the plaintiff to bring
a claim against the third party directly if it arose out of the same
transaction as the main claim?
A.

Absence of a Single State Forum

Although Kroger resolved the question of whether ancillary jurisdiction will support a claim by the plaintiff against a third-party
defendant when plaintiff could have consolidated all its non-federal claims in state court,21 8 it did not specifically resolve the ques214. 437 U.S. at 376.
215. 437 U.S. at 377.
216. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra. See also 3 MooRE's, supra note 74,
§ 14.27 [1], at 14-572 to -574 (1978).
217. 437 U.S. at 376.
218. For example in Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss.
1976), plaintiff's 61 head of cattle drowned when a bayou flooded. The plaintiff sought recovery for the value of the cattle under an insurance policy with
the defendant. The insurance company filed a third party complaint against
the local insurance agent for failing to give notice as required. The plaintiff
then filed a claim directly against the insurance agent based upon the same
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tion of whether ancillary jurisdiction will support such a claim
when plaintiff could not consolidate all of its non-federal claims in
a single state court. In Saalfrank v. O'Daniel,219 an Indiana resident brought an action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident with an Ohio citizen. After the Ohio citizen filed a
third party complaint against an Indiana hospital, the Indiana
plaintiff sought to bring a claim directly against the Indiana hospital. This claim, which was based on plaintiffs fall from a hospital
bed which aggravated his injuries, alleged that the hospital was
negligent in failing to provide proper restraints. 220 The plaintiff
was forced to sue the other driver in Ohio because the accident
was in Ohio, the defendant was from Ohio and it was unlikely that
the plaintiff could acquire personal jurisdiction in Indiana. The
plaintiff was forced to sue the hospital in Indiana because the hospital was located there and the lack of diversity would bar original
federal jurisdiction. Emphasizing that there was no single court in
which plaintiff could bring all of its claims, the district court allowed the third-party claim despite the lack of diversity. 221 Since
all the claims derived from a common nucleus of operative fact, the
trial court treated the claim as falling within its pendent jurisdiction.222

219.
220.
221.
222.

facts. The court allowed the claim against the non-diverse third party on a
state law issue under ancillary jurisdiction. Of course the answer to this case
is now easy. The plaintiff could have brought all the claims against the defendants originally in state court. If the plaintiff brings one of the claims in
federal court, the plaintiff will have to divide the lawsuit if he subsequently
wishes to bring a separate claim against the third party when there is no independent basis of jurisdiction because of the lack of diversity between the
plaintiff and the third party. See also Hadinger v. Bently Lab., Inc., 427 F.
Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1977); C.C.F. Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392
F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see Burleson v. Costal Recreation, Inc., 595
F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1978).
390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 52.
This case is novel in that it is one of the few to deal directly with the issue of
collusion. On a motion to reconsider, the hospital first raised the question of
whether there was collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant to provide the plaintiff assistance in recovering from the hospital. The plaintiff's
attorney did write the defense attorney and request that he file a third party
complaint against the hospital: "Our purpose is to make it possible to make
the hospital the defendant of the plaintiff in the same proceeding." The plaintiffs attorney prepared the motion papers, the third-party complaint, the
summons and other documents that were then delivered to the defense attorney. However the court concluded that under Section 1359, collusion does
not exist when "a party with a bona fide legal interest solicits another party
with a similar bona fide legal interest to assert that legal interest and aids in
doing so." Id. at 54. There were good faith and legally supportable reasons
for both the plaintiff and the defendant to encourage the defendant to bring
in the third party.
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The trial court decision in Saalfrank was reversed by the Sixth
Circuit which concluded that the trial court incorrectly relied on
Gibbs.223 Gibbs was based on a federal question, whereas jurisdiction was based only on diversity in Saalfrank. Second, in Gibbs
the state claim asserted by the plaintiff was asserted against the
same defendant as the federal claim. Here the additional claim
was against the third party, not against the defendant. The Sixth
Circuit did not adopt an inflexible rule of general application, but
had no difficulty in finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to recover, particularly because a
prior trial in state court indicated that the state of Indiana retained
a significant interest in the action. Even if there had been judicial
power, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to hear the claim.
After Kroger, the portion of the opinion concluding there was no
power is sufficient to resolve the issue.
Notwithstanding the question of discretion, this case is not as
easy as Kroger, where all claims of the plaintiff could have been
brought in a single state court.2 24 In this case, the plaintiff could
only sue the hospital in an Indiana state court, but could not sue
the other driver in any Indiana court because of the lack of personal jurisdiction. Lacking a definitive Supreme Court opinion,
the Sixth Circuit was not convinced that the federal policies of judicial economy and resolution of an entire case as enunciated in
Gibbs were sufficient to justify the hearing of the claim by the
plaintiff against the third party.225 Although the Supreme Court
223. 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
224. Two cases that had adopted the majority rule and therefore continue to be
good law after the decision of the Supreme Court are Fawvor v. Texaco, 546
F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (all claims could have been brought in state court),
and Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972) (basic
third-party complaint had been dismissed). See also Northern Contracting
Co. v. C.J. Lagenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a
discussion of Kenrose, see Fourth CircuitReview, 30 WASH. & LEE L REV. 295
(1973).
A unique factual situation is presented by Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger
Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Following a compulsory counterclaim by
the defendant, the plaintiff filed a third-party complaint for indemnity pursuant to Rule 14(b). The difficulty arose because the Georgia defendant then
sought to file a claim for breach of a subcontract agreement against the Georgia third party. Although recognizing that this claim was not contemplated
by Rule 14, the court concluded that it was analogous to a claim by the third
party back against the plaintiff since the party asserting the claim had been
brought into the forum involuntarily, and therefore an independent basis of
jurisdiction was not required. See Fraser, supra note 101, at 544-45.
If the original action is brought in state courts and the defendant removes
to federal court, the objection that the plaintiff is attempting to circumvent
federal jurisdictional limits in asserting a claim against a third party disappears. See Ayer v. General Dynamics Corp. 82 F.R.D. 115, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
225. 533 F.2d at 329-30.
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would agree with the Sixth Circuit's emphasis upon the limits of
federal jurisdiction, the absence of a single state forum is a significant factor that should not be overlooked.
B.

Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

The other extreme occurs where the primary claim is not based
on diversity but is based on a federal statute creating exclusive
federal jurisdiction. If exclusive federal jurisdiction exists and if
the claim by the plaintiff against the third party is a state-law claim
based on diversity, would the Court reach a result different than
that reached in Kroger, assuming the state law claim arose out of
the same transaction and satisfied the seventh sentence?
This situation is best illustrated by cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Although some courts have refused
to allow a plaintiff to add a non-federal claim against a third party
that has been brought into a FTCA suit,226 the possibility that the
court might reach a different result is supported by Davis v. United
States. 227 The administrator of the decedent's estate sued in state
court the owner of the airplane, based upon the state Wrongful
Death Act. The suit brought in federal court under the FTCA
charged that the U.S. Government failed to properly supervise the
pre-flight planning of the pilot, failed to give the pilot a weather
briefing, and improperly gave clearance and direction to the pilot.228 The government filed a third-party complaint against the
airplane owner, alleging that it was responsible for the accident
because its pre-flight planning was inadequate and it conducted a
flight in sub-standard weather conditions. The plaintiff filed an action against the third party, asserting the same claims as in the
state court. Thus, there was one accident and one injury but two
lawsuits, one against the U.S. Government in federal court and one
226. Corbi v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (there was diversity
between the plaintiff and the third party, but the jurisdictional amount was
not satisfied).
Another case involving an exclusive federal statute is L & E Co. v. United
States, 351 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1965). The case was based on a construction
project at a military installation in California, with the primary claim resting
on the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(d) (b) (1976). There was a third-party complaint, then a claim by the plaintiff against the third party. The court, without
any explanation or detail, simply said that there was original jurisdiction of
the plaintiffs claim against a defendant and "[w] e think that it also had ancillary jurisdiction over the claim of [the plaintiff] against the [third party]...
All of these claims arose out of the same 'transaction or occurence.'" 351 F.2d
at 882. There was no discussion of ancillary jurisdiction in this particular context at all, nor was there any specific acknowledgement of the role of the federal statute.
227. 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
228. Id. at 207.
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against the owner in state court. 229
The federal trial court emphasized that it was difficult to imagine any two cases more interrelated than these.230 There was a
common nucleus of operative fact; the federal claim against the
government was substantial; and no part of the lawsuit in federal
court could be brought in state court. 231 Therefore, it reasoned
that Gibbs should apply to permit the complaint to be amended so
as to bring the non-diverse state claim into federal court. An additional objection was made that the proposed amendment would require a jury trial, which is not allowed under the FTCA.232 Under
Rule 42, however, procedures could be developed so that the role of
the jury and the judge would be properly served. The court did
require a formal statement by the plaintiff that the state court
alclaims would be not actively prosecuted, and that discovery
233
ready completed would be transfered to the federal court.
The question is whether this case is valid authority after Kroger. Unlike Kroger, the main claim was based on an exclusive federal statute. It would be impossible to bring all the claims in one
action because the federal government cannot be sued in state
court. If the claim by the Michigan plaintiff against the Michigan
third party is not allowed, multiple actions will necessarily result.
On the other hand there was already a pending action in state
court in which the plaintiff had asserted her claims, while now she
is attempting to bring those claims into federal court. No language
in the Court's opinion carves out an exception when there is exclusive federal jurisdiction, but policy reasons would support such an
exception where the actual connection between the two claims is
234
this close.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
350 F. Supp. at 208.
One of the first appellate cases decided since Kroger supports this conclusion. In Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1979), the plaintiff asserted
Federal Tort Claims Act charges against the Government, which impleaded a
private hospital. The plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to assert

claims directly against the hospital was granted, provided the trial court
found it satisfied the Gibbs criteria. Emphasizing that the diversity statute
relied on in Kroger has been interpreted restrictively, while the FI'CA has
been liberally construed, id. at 73, the court allowed this "pendent" claim because the alternative would force the plaintiffs to pursue their claims against

the Government and the hospital in separate federal and state forums. Id. at
72.
The court manufactured another distinction with Kroger, by pointing out
that the Government's identification complaint, "although it failed to make
mention of the fact, was bottomed on an independent federal jurisdictional
basis, 28 U.S.C. § 1345." Id. at 67. Since a separate jurisdictional basis has
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A further distinction suggested by the FTCA cases is that to
bring the plaintiff's claim against the third party within ancillary
jurisdiction, the original jurisdiction-creating claim must not be
merely federal in nature, but must rest on a substantial federal interest.2 35 In rejecting a proposed complaint by an injured post office patron against the third-party owners of the post office
property that had been leased to the Government, the district
court reluctantly concluded that an independent basis of jurisdiction was necessary, requiring the plaintiff to split his claim between federal and state court.2 36 The court suggested that since
the court applies state law in redressing claims under the FTCA237
the mere use of this statute does not imply a substantial federal
question. On the other hand, if the primary claims were based
upon a statute, such as the anti-trust statute, which does constitute
a substantial claim, then the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs later claim against the third party would be more
238
easily justified.
C.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

In contrast with this situation where the original claim is based
upon an exclusively federal jurisdictional statute is the situation
that arises from a statute creating subject matter jurisdiction concurrently in the federal and state courts. Suppose a railroad
worker is being transported in a railroad truck to a job site, when
the truck is involved in a collision with an automobile. The railroad worker elects to sue the railroad in federal court under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act. The railroad files a third-party
claim for indemnity against the driver of the automobile. May the
railroad employee then ifie a Rule 14(a) claim directly against the
third-party driver even if both are citizens of the same state and
there is no independent jurisdiction?2 39 The immediate answer
after Kroger might be that since the railroad worker has a statutory option of suing under the Act in either federal or state court,
by electing federal court he has also accepted the limitations of

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

never been required for the third-party indemnification complaint, the statute has no significance.
If the plaintiff asserting a claim directly against the third party wishes to
rely on the FTCA as an independent jurisdictional basis the availability of
that federal statute may be lost if a timely administrative claim has not been
filed. "See West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1979).
Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973). But
see UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
367 F. Supp. at 1038.
For the law under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
367 F. Supp. at 1039.
The facts are suggested by McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960).
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federal jurisdiction and the resulting inability to simultaneously
sue the other driver. However, although FELA does not grant exclusive federal jurisdiction, the grant of concurrent jurisdiction illustrates the Congressional concern that the worker be treated
fairly.240 Requiring the worker to choose between the two lawsuits, with the party defendant blaming the absentee defendant, or
one lawsuit in state protection for the worker, may not provide the
assurance of an adequate remedy desired by Congress. The existence of the federal statute and its procedural protections demonstrates a strong federal concern with the plight of the railroad
worker. On the other hand, the railroad worker has an option to
bring his claim against the railroad in state court, where the driver
could also be sued. Therefore, unlike an exclusive statute, such a
concurrent statute does not provide a strong basis for the argument that the claim of the plaintiff against the third party should
be heard within ancillary jurisdiction.
D.

Admiralty Jurisdiction

Another area of federal law that might deserve different treatment is maritime law. In Lopez v. Oldendorf,241 a boom injured the
leg of the plaintiff longshoreman. The action was brought against
Oldendorf, the owner of the ship, alleging the unseaworthiness of
the vessel. The owner filed a third party action against the stevedoring company and the operator of the boom, seeking indemnity
from both.242 Subsequently, Lopez amended his complaint to fie a
claim directly against the owner of the boom for negligence. On
appeal, the third party challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
hear the Rule 14(a) claim because of lack of diversity between itself and Lopez. However, the complaint clearly indicated that "the
basis of jurisdiction [was] the admiralty and maritime nature of
the claim, ' 2 4 3 and the court retained the claim. Does this mean
that even though the substantive allegation is negligence, the fact
that the complaint refers to Rule 9(h) establishes an independent
basis of jurisdiction, namely the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Such an exception, which is not raised in Kro240. See Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 922
(1976). ("[I]f a case similar to McPherson were presented today it Would be
necessary to determine whether an FELA case affords a sufficiently substantial federal question basis of jurisdiction to support a pendent state law
claim."). See generally Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary
and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 775-76 (1972).
241. 545 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1976).
242. Id. at 838.
243. Id. at 839. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). See also Rosario v.
American-Export Isbrandsen Lines, Inc., 395 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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ger, would rest not merely on a federal statute, but directly upon
the provisions of article I.
In addition to the cases in which there has been independent
jurisdiction over the claim by the plaintiff against the third party
because of admiralty claims are those cases in which diversity allowed the court to hear the plaintiff's claim.244 Those cases continue to be valid even after Kroger. On the other hand, just as a
court has discretion as to any valid claim under Rule 14, the court
will still have discretion as to these direct claims of the plaintiff
even though the mandates of both Rule 14 and article III are satis24 5
fied.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

There are several possible legal theories that a plaintiff may
utilize when bringing suit against a third party under the seventh
sentence of Rule 14(a): 1) the primary claim is based on an exclusive federal statute expressing a paramount federal interest; (2)
the primary claim is based upon an exclusive federal statute that
relies on state substantive law; 3) the primary claim is based on a
federal statute that provides jurisdiction concurrent with the state;
4) the primary claim is based on maritime law; 5) all the claims are
based on state law, and there is diversity between the plaintiff and
the third party, but the amount is less than $10,000; 6) diversity
does not exist between the plaintiff and third party, and the plaintiff could not have sued the defendant and the third party in one
state; 7) there is no diversity between the plaintiff and the third
party, but the plaintiff could have sued the defendant and the third
party in one state; 8) there is diversity between the plaintiff and
the third party and the amount in controversy is greater than
$10,000 but there are discretionary reasons why the court should
not take the claim.
Which of these claims may now be heard by the federal court
under its ancillary jurisdictions? The seventh claim, present in
Kroger, will not be allowed. Likewise, Kroger provides a strong
answer to the eighth claim because of the discretionary nature of
Rule 14. As to the others we can only speculate. The lower courts
have concluded in most instances that it will not be allowed, but
should that be the answer? Should distinctions be drawn when
there is a strong federal interest in the primary claim to ensure
244. See, e.g., D'Alberto v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Bonath v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
245. E.g., Joseph v. Chrysler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347 (W.D. Pa. 1973). (The court concluded that a case, already complex, would be burdened by a separate claim
for damages based upon facts arising from a time period subsequent to those
of the primary claim).
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that it is not weakened or undermined? Should the additional
claim be heard in federal court if there is no alternate forum where
all the claims can be heard? Should ancillary jurisdiction cover the
additional claim when the primary claim is exclusively federal?
Kroger, although it answers the question of ancillary jurisdiction in one area, certainly does not resolve all the questions that
have arisen under Rule 14. The problem of an additional claim by
the defendant against the third party has not been addressed by
the Court, nor by the rule, which deserves further amendment.
The issue of a Rule 14(a) claim under the fourth sentence by the
third party back against the defendant really should not be much
of a question because it ties in so closely to Rule 13 compulsory
and permissive counterclaims. The major problem is the third
party claim back against the plaintiff as authorized by the sixth
sentence. Are there persuasive reasons in the majority opinion in
Kroger that suggest that such a Rule 14(a) claim now requires an
independent basis of jurisdiction? Finally, with the plaintiff asserting a Rule 14(a) claim against the third party, are there any instances in which the federal claim is so strong that the case should
be heard despite the absence of an independent jurisdictional
base? The scope and dimensions of ancillary jurisdiction under
Federal Rule 14 are far from determined.

